But neither
victory was bloodless. El Teb cost 24 officers and 168 men; Tamai,
13 officers and 208 men. The effect of these operations was the dispersal
of Osman Digna's gathering. That astute man, not for the first
or last time, made a good retreat.
Ten thousand men had thus been killed in the space of three months
in the Eastern Soudan. By the discipline of their armies the Government
were triumphant. The tribes of the Red Sea shore cowered before them.
But as they fought without reason, so they conquered without profit.
As soon as Gordon had been finally refused the assistance of
Zubehr Pasha, it was evident that the rescue of the garrisons
was impossible. The General had been sent as the last hope. Rightly or
wrongly, his recommendations were ignored. His mission was an admitted
failure. After that the only question was how to bring him away as quickly
as possible. It was certain that he would not come willingly. Force was
necessary. Yet it was difficult to know how to apply it. After the
victories in the Eastern Soudan the opportunity presented itself.
The road was open. The local tribes were crushed. Berber had not then
fallen. The Mahdi was himself still on the road from El Obeid to Khartoum.
Sir Evelyn Baring saw the chance. He did not then occupy the formidable
and imposing position in Egyptian politics that he has since attained.
But with all his influence he urged the despatch of a small flying column
to Khartoum. His idea was simple. One thousand or twelve hundred men
were to mount on camels and ride thither via Berber. Those who fell ill or
whose camels broke down would have to take their chance by the roadside.
The plan, however, broke down in the military detail. Only one honourable
course remained - a regular expedition. This the British Agent at once
began to urge. This the Government obstinately refused to admit;
and meanwhile time was passing.
The situation at Khartoum became grave even before the breach between
General Gordon and Mr. Gladstone's Cabinet was complete. While the British
Government was indulging in vengeful operations in the Eastern Soudan,
the Mahdi advanced slowly but steadily upon the town with a following
variously estimated at from fifteen to twenty thousand men. On the 7th
of March Colonel Stewart telegraphed from Khartoum: 'The Mahdi has
attempted to raise the people of Shendi by an emissary. . . . We may be
cut off;' [Lieut.-Colonel Stewart to Sir E. Baring, March 7, 1884.]
and on the 11th Gordon himself reported: 'The rebels are four hours
distant on the Blue Nile.' [Major-General Gordon to Sir E. Baring,
March 11, 1884.] Thereafter no more telegrams came, for on the 15th
the wire was cut between Shendi and Berber, and the blockade
had commenced.
The long and glorious defence of the town of Khartoum will always
fascinate attention.
