The comparisons that would follow such an accomplishment were
self-evident and agreeable even to anticipate. The idea of re-conquering
the Soudan presented itself indefinitely, but not unpleasingly, alike to
the Government and the people of Great Britain. The unforeseen course
of events crystallised the idea into a policy.
On the 1st of March, 1896, the battle of Adowa was fought, and Italy
at the hands of Abyssinia sustained a crushing defeat. Two results
followed which affected other nations. First, a great blow had been struck
at European prestige in North Africa. It seemed probable that the
Abyssinian success would encourage the Dervishes to attack the Italians at
Kassala. It was possible that they might also attack the Egyptians at
Suakin or on the Wady Halfa frontier. Secondly, the value of Italy as a
factor in European politics was depreciated. The fact that her defeat had
been assisted by the arms and munitions of war which had been supplied to
the Abyssinians from French and Russian sources complicated the situation.
The Triple Alliance was concerned. The third partner had been weakened.
The balance might be restored if Great Britain would make some open
sign of sympathy.
Moreover, the expectations of the Egyptian military authorities were
soon fulfilled. The Dervishes threatened Kassala as soon as the news of
Adowa reached them, and indeed there were signs of increased activity in
Omdurman itself. In these circumstances the British Government determined
to assist Italy by making a demonstration on the Wady Halfa frontier.
They turned to Egypt. It had always been recognised that the recovery of
the lost provinces was a natural and legitimate aspiration. 'The doubtful
point was to decide the time when the military and financial resources of
the country were sufficiently developed to justify an assumption of the
offensive.' [LORD CROMER'S REPORTS: EGYPT, No. 2, 1896.] From a purely
Egyptian point of view the best possible moment had not yet arrived.
A few more years of recuperation were needed. The country would fight the
Soudan campaigns more easily if first refreshed by the great reservoirs
which were projected. For more than two years both projects had been
pressed upon the Government of his Highness the Khedive - or, to write
definitely, upon Lord Cromer. At regular intervals Sir Herbert Kitchener
and Sir William Garstin would successively visit the British Agency
(it would be treason to call it 'Government House') - the one to urge
the case for a war, the other to plead for a reservoir. The reservoir
had won. Only a few weeks before the advance to Dongola was ordered
Garstin met Kitchener returning from the Agency. The engineer inquired
the result of the General's interview. 'I'm beaten,' said Kitchener
abruptly; 'you've got your dam' - and Garstin went on his way rejoicing.
The decision of the British Government came therefore as a complete
surprise to the Cairene authorities.
