After Proper Solicitation, Therefore, He Yielded To Their
Appeals.
Then he looked round for a subordinate.
The Khalifa Ali-Wad-Helu
presented himself. In the Soudan every advantage and honour accrues to the
possessor of an army, and the rival chief saw a chance of regaining his
lost power. This consideration was not, however, lost upon Abdullah.
He accepted the offer with apparent delight, but he professed himself
unable to spare any rifles for the army which Ali-Wad-Helu aspired to lead.
'Alas!' he cried, 'there are none. But that will make no difference to so
famous a warrior.' Ali-Wad-Helu, however, considered that it would make
a great deal of difference, and declined the command. Osman Sheikh-ed-Din
offered to lead the army, if he might arm the riverain tribes and use them
as auxiliaries to swell his force. This roused the disapproval of Yakub.
Such a policy, he declared, was fatal. The riverain tribes were traitors -
dogs - worthy only of being destroyed; and he enlarged upon the more refined
methods by which his policy might be carried out. The squabble continued,
until at last the Khalifa, despairing of any agreement, decided merely to
reinforce Mahmud, and accordingly ordered the Emir Yunes to march to
Metemma with about 5,000 men. But it was then discovered that Mahmud hated
Yunes, and would have none of him. At this the Khalifa broke up his camp,
and the Dervish army marched back for a second time, in vexation
and disgust, to the city.
It seemed to those who were acquainted with the Dervish movements
that all offensive operations on their part had been definitely abandoned.
Even in the Intelligence Department it was believed that the break-up of
the Kerreri camp was the end of the Khalifa's determination to move north.
There would be a hot and uneventful summer, and with the flood Nile the
expedition would begin its final advance. The news which was received on
the 15th of February came as a great and pleasant surprise. Mahmud was
crossing the Nile and proposed to advance on Berber without reinforcements
of any kind. The Sirdar, highly satisfied at this astounding piece of good
fortune, immediately began to mass his force nearer the confluence. On the
21st the British at Abu Dis were instructed to hold themselves in
readiness. The Seaforths began their journey from Cairo, and the various
battalions of the Egyptian army pressed forward towards Berber and
Atbara fort. On the 25th, Mahmud being reported as having crossed
to the right bank, the general concentration was ordered.
CHAPTER XI: RECONNAISSANCE
Although the story of a campaign is made up of many details which
cannot be omitted, since they are essential to the truth as well as the
interest of the account, it is of paramount importance that the reader
should preserve throughout a general idea. For otherwise the marches,
forays, and reconnaissance will seem disconnected and purposeless affairs,
and the battle simply a greater operation undertaken in the same haphazard
fashion. To appreciate the tale it is less necessary to contemplate the
wild scenes and stirring incidents, than thoroughly to understand the
logical sequence of incidents which all tend to and ultimately culminate
in a decisive trial of strength.
The hazards which were courted by the daring occupation of Berber
have been discussed in the last chapter. From October to December the
situation was threatening. In December it suddenly became critical.
Had the Emir Mahmud advanced with the Dervishes at Metemma even as late
as the middle of January, he might possibly have re-captured Berber.
If the great Omdurman army had taken the field, the possibility would have
become a certainty. The young Kordofan general saw his opportunity, and
begged to be allowed to seize it. But it was not until the Khalifa had sent
his own army back into the city that, being very badly informed of the
numbers and disposition of the Egyptian force, he allowed the Metemma
Dervishes to move.
Mahmud received permission to advance at the end of January.
He eagerly obeyed the longed-for order. But the whole situation
was now changed. The Egyptian army was concentrated; the British brigade
had arrived; the railway had reached Geneinetti; the miserable hamlet of
Dakhila, at the confluence, had grown from a small depot to a fort,
and from a fort to an entrenched camp, against which neither Dervish
science nor strength could by any possibility prevail. Perhaps Mahmud
did not realise the amazing power of movement that the railway had given
his foes; perhaps he still believed, with the Khalifa, that Berber was held
only by 2,000 Egyptians; or else - and this is the most probable - he was
reckless of danger and strong in his own conceit. At any rate, during the
second week in February he began to transport himself across the Nile,
with the plain design of an advance north. With all the procrastination of
an Arab he crawled leisurely forward towards the confluence of the rivers.
At El Aliab some idea of the strength of the Atbara entrenchment seems to
have dawned upon him. He paused undecided. A council was held. Mahmud was
for a continued advance and for making a direct attack on the enemy's
position. Osman Digna urged a more prudent course. Many years of hard
fighting against disciplined troops had taught the wily Hadendoa slaver
the power of modern rifles, and much sound tactics besides. He pressed his
case with jealous enthusiasm upon the commander he detested and despised.
An insurmountable obstacle confronted them. Yet what could not be overcome
might be avoided. The hardy Dervishes could endure privations which would
destroy the soldiers of civilisation. Barren and inhospitable as was
the desert, they might move round the army at the Atbara fort and so
capture Berber after all. Once they were behind the Egyptians,
these accursed ones were lost. The railway - that mysterious source of
strength - could be cut. The host that drew its life along it must fight
at a fearful disadvantage or perish miserably.
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