Instead of
the powerful Lee-Metford rifle, with its smokeless powder, its magazine
action, and its absence of recoil, they were armed with the Martini-Henry,
which possessed none of these advantages. In place of the deadly Maxim
there was the Gardner gun - the very gun that jammed at Tamai, and that
jammed again at Abu Klea. The artillery was also in every respect inferior
to that now in general use. Besides all this, the principles of
fire-discipline and of scientific musketry were new, little understood,
and hardly admitted. Nevertheless, the Camel Corps went boldly forward,
and engaged an enemy whose destruction ultimately required the strength
of a better-armed and better-instructed army twelve times as strong.
On the 3rd of January they reached Gakdul Wells. A hundred miles
of their march was accomplished. But they were now delayed by the
necessity of escorting a second column of supplies to Gakdul, and after
that until the arrival of reinforcements which raised their strength to
1,800 of all ranks. The interval was employed in building two small forts
and establishing an advanced depot; nor was it until the 13th that the
march was resumed. The number of camels was not sufficient for the
necessities of the transport. The food of the camels was too poor for the
work they had to perform. By the 16th, however, they had made fifty miles,
and approached the wells of Abu Klea. Here their further advance was
disputed by the enemy.
The news of the advance of the Desert Column had been duly reported
to the Mahdi and his Arab generals. A small party of English, it was said,
with camels and some cavalry, were coming swiftly to the rescue of the
accursed city. Their numbers were few, scarce 2,000 men. How should they
hope to prevail against 'the expected Mahdi' and the conquering Ansar
who had destroyed Hicks? They were mad; yet they should die; not one
should escape. The delay in the advance offered ample opportunity. A great
force of Arabs was concentrated. Slatin relates how several thousand men
under important Emirs were detached from the army before Khartoum
and marched northward eager for the slaughter of 'the enemies of God.'
At Metemma the main strength of the Jaalin tribe was collected.
With the reinforcements from Omdurman the total force of the Arabs
actually at hand was not less than 10,000, and behind were many thousands
more. They permitted the little column to advance until their retreat,
if defeated, was impossible, and then, confident of victory, offered
battle near the wells of Abu Klea.
The Camel Corps remained halted during the morning of the 16th,
and built a small fort, in which they placed their reserve of stores,
and made some arrangement for the reception of wounded. At one o'clock
they moved leisurely forward, passed through the rocky defile which led
into the valley of Abu Klea and bivouacked. Early the next morning
the force moved out in square formation and advanced upon the enemy.
The most savage and bloody action ever fought in the Soudan by British
troops followed. Notwithstanding the numbers and the valour of the Arabs,
that they penetrated the square, and that they inflicted on the troops
a loss of nine officers and sixty-five men killed and nine officers
and eighty-five men wounded - 10 percent of the entire force - they were
driven from the field with great slaughter, and the Desert Column
camped at the wells.
On the morning of the 18th they rested, placed their wounded in the
small fort they had built, and buried their dead. In the afternoon they
continued their advance, marched all through the night, and, having
covered twenty-three miles, halted exhausted, almost within sight of
the river, at daylight on the 19th. Meanwhile the enemy had again
collected in great strength, and an effective rifle fire was opened on
the column. Sir Herbert Stewart received the wound of which a few weeks
later he died. The command devolved upon Sir Charles Wilson. The position
was desperate. Water was running short. The Nile was only four miles away;
but the column were impeded by their wounded and stores, and between the
river and the thirsty men lay the Dervish army, infuriated by their losses
and fully aware of the sore straits to which their astonishing enemy
was now reduced.
It now became necessary to divide the small force. Some must remain
to guard the baggage and the wounded; the others must fight their way to
the water. At three o'clock in the afternoon of the 19th, 900 men left the
hastily made zeriba and marched towards the river. Without their camels
or those of the transport they appeared insignificant, a mere speck on
the broad plain of Metemma. The Dervishes hastened to clinch the matter.
The square advances slowly and painfully over the stony ground,
with frequent jerky halts to preserve order and to pick up the wounded.
Little puffs of white smoke dot the distant sandhills. Here and there
a gaudy flag waves defiantly. In front the green tops of the palm-trees
by the Nile tantalise but stimulate the soldiers. On the left the great
mud labyrinth of Metemma stretches indefinitely. Suddenly the firing
stops. The low scrub in front is alive with the swarming figures of
the enemy. All the flags dance forward together. Ragged white figures
spring up in hundreds. Emirs on horses appear as if by magic. Everywhere
are men running swiftly forward, waving their spears and calling upon the
Prophet of God to speed their enterprise. The square halts. The weary men
begin to fire with thoughtful care, The Dervishes drop thickly. On then,
children of the desert! you are so many, they are so few.
