Expedition; so that
before the Spaniards could draw near Plymouth, they were welcomed at sea
by the lord admiral and his fleet, who continued to fight with them till
they came to anchor at Calais. The particulars of the fight and its
success I purposely omit, being things so well known[347].
[Footnote 347: This surely is a poor excuse for omitting the glorious
destruction of the Spanish Armada; yet in a Collection of Voyages, it
were improper to attempt supplying even this great omission, by any
composition of our own; as it may be found in the historians of the
time. - E.]
While this great armada was preparing, her majesty had frequent and
perfect intelligence of the designs of the Spaniards; and knowing that
the king of Spain intended to invade England by means of a mighty fleet
from his own coast, she caused her royal navy to be fitted out under the
conduct of the lord high admiral of England, whom she stationed at
Plymouth as the fittest place for attending their coming. Knowing
however, that it was not the Armada alone which could endanger the
safety of England, as it was too weak for any enterprise on land,
without the assistance of the Prince of Parma and his army in Flanders,
she therefore appointed thirty ships of the Hollanders to lie at anchor
off Dunkirk, where the prince and his army were to have embarked in flat
bottomed boats, which were built on purpose and all in readiness for the
expedition to England. Thus by the wise precautions of the queen, the
prince was effectually prevented from putting to sea with his flat
boats; but in truth neither his vessels nor his army were in readiness,
which caused the king of Spain to be jealous of him ever after, and is
supposed to have hastened his end.
Although her majesty had taken the most vigilant precautions to foresee
and prevent all dangers that might threaten from sea, yet did she not
deem herself and country too secure against the enemy by these means,
and therefore prepared a royal army to receive them in case of landing.
But it was not the will of God that the enemy should set foot on
England, and the queen became victorious over him at sea with small
hazard, and little bloodshed of her subjects. Having thus shewn the
designs of the Spaniards, and the course pursued by the queen to prevent
them, I propose now to consider the errors committed on both sides[348].
[Footnote 348: Our readers are requested to remember that these are the
reflections of Sir William Monson, a contemporary. - E.]
Nothing could appear more rational or more likely to happen, after the
Duke of Medina Sidonia had got intelligence of the state of our navy,
than a desire to surprise them at unawares in harbour; since he well
knew, if he had taken away or destroyed our strength at sea, that he
might have landed when and where he pleased, which is a great advantage
to an invading enemy: