Church. Col. III. 157.]
The directions given by the king of Spain to his general, the duke of
Medina Sidonia, were to repair, as wind and weather might allow, to the
road of Calais in Picardy, there to wait the arrival of the prince of
Parma and his army, and on their meeting they were to open a letter
containing their farther instructions. He was especially commanded to
sail along the coasts of Brittany and Normandy in going up the channel,
to avoid being discovered by the English; and, if he even met the
English fleet, he was in no case to offer them battle, but only to
defend himself in case of attack. On coming athwart the North Cape[345]
the duke was assailed with contrary wind and foul weather, by which he
was forced to take shelter in the _Groyne_, or bay of Corunna, where
part of his fleet waited for him.
[Footnote 345: Perhaps Cape Ortegal may be here meant, being the most
northern head land of Spain, and not far from Corunna, called the Groyne
in the text. - E.]
When about to depart from Corunna, the duke got intelligence from an
English fisherman, that our fleet had lately been at sea, but had put
back again and discharged most of their men, as not expecting the
Spanish armada this year. This intelligence occasioned the duke to alter
his resolutions, and to disobey the instructions given him by the king;
yet this was not done without some difficulty, as the council was
divided in opinion, some holding it best to observe the kings commands,
while others were anxious not to lose the opportunity of surprising our
fleet at unawares, when they hoped to burn and destroy them. Diego
Flores de Valdes, who commanded the squadron of Andalusia, and on whom
the duke most relied, because of his judgment and experience in maritime
affairs, was the main cause of persuading to make the attempt upon our
ships in harbour, and in that design they directed their course for
England.
The first land they fell in with was the Lizard, being the most
southerly point of Cornwall, which they mistook for the Ram-head off
Plymouth; and as the night was at hand, they tacked out to sea, laying
their account to make an attempt upon our ships in Plymouth next
morning. In the mean time, while thus deceived in the land, they were
discovered by captain Fleming, a pirate or freebooter who had been
roving at sea, and who knowing them to be the Spanish fleet, repaired in
all haste to Plymouth, and gave notice to our fleet then, riding at
anchor, as follows:
THE ENGLISH FLEET[346].
_Ships. Commanders. Tons. Guns. Men._
The Ark Royal The Lord Admiral 800 32 400
Revenge Sir F. Drake, vice admiral
Victory Sir J. Hawkins, rear admiral 800 52 400
Lion Lord Thomas Howard 500 80 250
Bear Lord Sheffield 900 40 500
Elizabeth-Jonas Sir Robert Southwell 900 40 500
Triumph Sir Martin Frobisher 1000 40 500
Hope Captain Crosse 600 30 250
Bonaventure - - Reyman 600 30 250
Dreadnought - - George Beeston 400 20 200
Nonparielle - - Thomas Fenner 500 50 250
Swiftsure - - William Fenner 400 20 200
Rainbow Lord Henry Seymour
Vauntguard Sir William Wentworth
Mary-Rose Captain Fenton
Antilope Sir Henry Palmer 350 16 160
Foresight Captain Baker 300 16 160
Aid - - John Wentworth
Swallow - - Richard Hawkins 330 16 160
Tiger - - William Wentworth 200 12 100
Scout - - Ashley 120 8 66
Bull
Tremontanny 8 70
Acatice 100 8 60
Charles, pinnace Captain Roberts
Moon - - Clifford
Spy - - Bradbury 50 5 40
Noy
[Footnote 346: This list, as given by Sir William Monson in the present
article, contains only the names of the ships and commanders; the other
circumstances enumerated, tonnage, guns, and men, are added from a list
of the royal navy of England at the death of queen Elizabeth, which will
be given hereafter. - E.]
Immediately on receiving the intelligence brought by Fleming, the lord
admiral got out his ships to sea with all possible expedition; so that
before the Spaniards could draw near Plymouth, they were welcomed at sea
by the lord admiral and his fleet, who continued to fight with them till
they came to anchor at Calais. The particulars of the fight and its
success I purposely omit, being things so well known[347].
[Footnote 347: This surely is a poor excuse for omitting the glorious
destruction of the Spanish Armada; yet in a Collection of Voyages, it
were improper to attempt supplying even this great omission, by any
composition of our own; as it may be found in the historians of the
time. - E.]
While this great armada was preparing, her majesty had frequent and
perfect intelligence of the designs of the Spaniards; and knowing that
the king of Spain intended to invade England by means of a mighty fleet
from his own coast, she caused her royal navy to be fitted out under the
conduct of the lord high admiral of England, whom she stationed at
Plymouth as the fittest place for attending their coming. Knowing
however, that it was not the Armada alone which could endanger the
safety of England, as it was too weak for any enterprise on land,
without the assistance of the Prince of Parma and his army in Flanders,
she therefore appointed thirty ships of the Hollanders to lie at anchor
off Dunkirk, where the prince and his army were to have embarked in flat
bottomed boats, which were built on purpose and all in readiness for the
expedition to England. Thus by the wise precautions of the queen, the
prince was effectually prevented from putting to sea with his flat
boats; but in truth neither his vessels nor his army were in readiness,
which caused the king of Spain to be jealous of him ever after, and is
supposed to have hastened his end.
