About This Time, The Inhabitants Of The Cities On The Lake Grew Weary Of The Long Protracted Warfare, And Sent Deputations To Our General, Offering To Submit Themselves To His Authority, And Declaring That They Had Been Constrained By The Mexicans To Persist Hitherto In Their Hostilities Against Us.

Cortes received them very graciously, and assured them of his protection, providing that they should conduct themselves properly for the future, and give him their assistance by supplying canoes and provisions to our army, and in the construction of barracks for the troops.

They readily promised all this, but performed very badly. Cortes had huts built for his detachment[7]; but the rest of us remained exposed to the weather, which was exceedingly severe and distressing, as it rained almost incessantly during June, July, and August.

Our detachment on the causeway of Tacuba continued our approach towards Mexico, filling up every ditch and canal as we advanced by means of the materials of the houses which we destroyed; and we every day gained possession of temples or houses, which stood apart from each other, and of the bridges by which they communicated. To avoid jealousy, our three companies took the duties of working and fighting alternately, our allies giving most important assistance in pulling down the houses and filling up the ditches and cross-cuts of the causeway. Every evening the whole of our men stood to their arms, and we sent off our allies before us, before retreating to our post for the night. During all this time, Sandoval, who carried on his approach from Tepejacac, was obliged to sustain continual attacks from the enemy; as likewise was Cortes, who now commanded at the third attack.

On his side there was an out-post of the Mexicans, at a place where one of the apertures in the causeway was too deep to be forded, and which had been strongly fortified by the enemy. He made a successful attack on this place, where he commanded in person, although the enemy made a brave resistance both by land and water; but he was obliged to retire at night without filling up the ditch, and he lost four Spaniards killed, and had above thirty wounded, the pass being commanded from the terraces of several houses in the water, and his brigantines were unable to get forward to protect his flanks, owing to the piles which the enemy had fixed under water. Guatimotzin and his Mexicans defended themselves with amazing bravery and resolution, trusting to wear us out and destroy us by continual assaults. On the 21st of June, the anniversary of the day of our first entry into Mexico, the enemy assailed us at every point of all our three attacks, both by land and water, in front, flanks, and rear, about two hours before day. The number fit for duty at our post on the causeway of Tacuba was 120 men, and all the allies attached to our detachment, were as usual off the causeway during the night. It was with the utmost difficulty that we were able to resist and repulse the enemy, of whom a great number were killed and wounded, losing two of our own soldiers. The enemy repeated their assaults on all the posts for two other nights successively; and on the third morning, just at day-break, they concentrated their whole force and made a desperate attack on our post. If our allies had been with us we should have been all lost. On this occasion our cavalry saved our rear, and our brigantines did signal service by clearing our flanks. After a most severe and long doubtful contest, we beat off the enemy and made four of their chiefs prisoners, eight of our soldiers being slain in this tough affair. I fear my readers may be tired of this constant repetition of battles, which my duty of historian compels me to relate: But if I were to give an account of every action which took place during the ninety-three days in which we were engaged in the siege of this great, strong, and populous city, every day and night of which time brought a perpetual succession of battles and assaults, my work would be without end, and would more resemble Amadis de Gaul and other romances of chivalry than a true history, which it really is.

Cortes became impatient of delay, and proposed in a council of war to make a general assault on the city, marching at once by all the three causeways, and uniting our whole force in the great square, whence we could command all the streets leading to that centre of Mexico. Some of the members of the council objected greatly to this plan, giving the preference to our present system of advancing gradually, filling up the ditches as we proceeded, and destroying the houses to make roads and defences of their materials. They alleged that if we were to succeed in forcing our way into the great square, we should in our turn be besieged in the heart of the city, exactly as we had been before our flight from Mexico, and be involved in much greater difficulties than now; as the enemy would be enabled to environ us with their whole force by land and water, and would cut off all possibility of our retreat, by cutting through the causeways. But Cortes, after hearing all these well founded reasons, still adhered to his own plan, and issued orders for the whole army, including the allies, to attack the city next day, and to use our utmost efforts to get possession of the great square. On the next morning therefore, having recommended ourselves to God in the solemn service of the mass, all our three detachments marched to attack the posts of the enemy on their several fronts. In our attack commanded by Alvarado, most of the Spaniards were wounded at the first ditch and parapet of the enemy; one Spaniard was slain, and above a thousand of our allies were killed or wounded.

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