It Follows That, Although England Has Most To Lose By The
Partition Of China, Even Though She Should Receive A Large Share Of
Territory, The United States Are Also Deeply Interested In The Question,
For Their Trade Is Already Considerable, And Is Likely, Under Favorable
Circumstances, To Undergo Great Expansion.
Let us, finally, examine the Chinese question from a political point of
view.
We concur with Mr. Colquhoun in believing that Englishmen are now at
the parting of the ways, and that their failure to take the right course
in the Far East will mean the loss of England's commercial supremacy, and,
eventually, the disintegration of the British Empire. He maintains that,
since November 16, 1896, when the German government was compelled by
Bismarck's revelations to disclose the drift of its future policy, it has
been apparent that there is an increasing tendency toward cooperation in
the Near East and the Par East between Germany and Russia, and therefore,
also, between those powers and France, which is Russia's ally. The
understanding is based upon mutual interest, territorial in the case of
Russia, commercial in that of Germany, and political in the case of
France. The cornerstone of the combination is Russia, whose goodwill is
sought for at all costs by France, in a lesser degree by Germany, and,
latterly, even by Austria-Hungary. The chief aim of the combination is the
reduction of England to a secondary position, politically and
commercially. In China, the outcome of the coalition has been to isolate
England completely. For some years past, her efforts to secure concessions
at Pekin have been frustrated by Russia and France. Meanwhile, these two
countries, and, more lately, Germany as well, have secured for themselves
solid advantages. Japan, on her part, since she was compelled to submit to
a revision of the Shimonoseki treaty, has been watching silently and
preparing anxiously for eventualities. England's official optimists talked
in 1895, however, as they still talk, of the successes gained, the
"rectification" of the Burmo-Chinese frontier and the incomplete "opening"
of the West River. As a matter of fact, the British government has done
little or nothing to establish overland railway communication from Burmah
to China, or to reach China "from behind," as Lord Salisbury called it;
and the Upper Yangtse, the main artery of China, has remained practically
unopened. Such, at least, was the situation a few months ago.
To understand the present situation, which is the natural sequel of 1895,
it is needful, first of all, to recognize the fact that Russia is, at this
moment, the protector of China against all comers, and that France
supports her firmly, while Germany, having once taken the decisive step of
placing herself alongside Russia, is likely to follow the czar's lead for
two sufficient reasons; namely, for fear of displeasing the Russian ally
of France, and because concessions are not likely to be obtained at Pekin
by Germany, if the latter country places itself in direct and open
opposition to the St. Petersburg government. Russian influence has, for
some time past, been omnipotent at Pekin, mainly through the kindly
assistance rendered to China in 1895, followed up by what has been
practically an offensive and defensive league. The nature of the
understanding between Russia and the Middle Kingdom has, indeed, for some
time been patent to all the world except Englishmen, the chief features of
it being: First, an offensive and defensive alliance; secondly, branch
railways through Manchuria; thirdly, the refortification of Port Arthur
and Talienwan, both to be paid for by China, and either or both of these
harbors to be placed at Russia's disposal whenever they may be required.
It is true that China has denied the existence of any agreement except
that concerning the northern Manchurian Railway, but Russia has never
denied anything except the accuracy of the version of the so-called
"Cassini" Convention, published by a Shanghai paper. Apart from the
existence of any written contract, the facts speak for themselves. Russia,
having had a prior lien on Kiao Chou, it is obvious that Germany could not
have seized that harbor in opposition to Russia. Again, what is to prevent
Germany from discovering some day that Kiao Chou does not "meet her
requirements," in which event what is there to hinder Russia from taking
over Kiao Chou and giving Germany another port? Provision has, in truth,
been made to enable Germany to treat Kiao Chou as a negotiable bill of
exchange.
There is really nothing unforeseen in the recent evolution of affairs in
the Far East. On the contrary, it has been clearly indicated by various
writers in the past fifty years. As far back as 1850, Meadows wrote:
"China will not be conquered by any Western power until she becomes the
Persia of some future Alexander the Great of Russia, which is the Macedon
of Europe. England, America and France will, if they are wise, wage,
severally or collectively, a war of exhaustion with Russia rather than
allow her to conquer China, for, when she has done that, she will be
mistress of the world." In reply to those who ridicule the policy of
"guarding against imaginary Russian dangers in China," he said: "Many may
suppose the danger to be too remote to be a practical subject for the
present generation. The subject is most practical at the present hour,
for, as the English, Americans and French now deal with China, and with
her relations to Russia, so the event will be. For those to whom 'it will
last our time' is a word of practical wisdom, this volume is not written."
Again, a few years later, Meadows wrote: "The greatest, though not
nearest, danger of a weak China lies precisely in those territorial
aggressions of Russia which she began two centuries ago, and which, if
allowed to go on, will speedily give her a large and populous territory,
faced with Sveaborgs and Sebastopols on the seaboard of Eastern Asia. Let
England, America and France beware how they create a sick giant in the Far
East.
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