But This
Unfairness Could Not Be Tolerated, And The British Minister At Pekin,
Where Sir Harry Parkes Had In The
Autumn of 1883 succeeded Sir Thomas
Wade, issued a proclamation that the hostilities between France and China
were tantamount to
A state of war, and that the laws of neutrality must be
strictly observed. The French resented this step, and showed some
inclination to retaliate by instituting a right to search for rice, but
fortunately this pretension was not pushed to extremities, and the war was
closed before it could produce any serious consequences. The French
devoted much of their attention to an attack on the Chinese possessions in
Formosa, and the occupation of Kelung; a fort in the northern part of that
island was captured, but the subsequent success of the French was small.
The Chinese displayed great energy and resource in forming defenses
against any advance inland from Kelung or Tamsui, and the French
government was brought to face the fact that there was nothing to be
gained by carrying on these desultory operations, and that unless they
were prepared to send a large expedition, it was computed of not less than
50,000 men, to attack Pekin, there was no alternative to coming to terms
with China. How strong this conviction had become may be gathered from the
fact that the compulsory retreat, in March, 1885, of the French from
before Langson, where some of the Chinese regular troops were drawn up
with a large force of Black and Yellow Flags - the latter of whom were in
Chinese pay - did not imperil the negotiations which were then far advanced
toward completion. On June 9 of the same year a treaty of peace was signed
by M. Patenotre and Li Hung Chang which gave France nothing more than the
Fournier Convention.
The military lessons of this war must be pronounced inconclusive, for the
new forces which China had organized since the Pekin campaign were never
fully engaged, and the struggle ended before the regular regiments sent to
Langson had any opportunity of showing their quality. But the impression
conveyed by the fighting in Formosa and the northern districts of Tonquin
was that China had made considerable progress in the military art, and
that she possessed the nucleus of an army that might become formidable.
But while the soldiers had made no inconsiderable improvement, as much
could not be said of the officers, and among the commanders there seemed
no grasp of the situation, and a complete inability to conduct a campaign.
Probably these deficiencies will long remain the really weak spot in the
Chinese war organization, and although they have men who will fight well,
the only capacity their commanders showed in Tonquin and Formosa was in
selecting strong positions and in fortifying them with consummate art. But
as the strongest position can be turned and avoided, and as the Chinese,
like all Asiatics, become demoralized when their rear is threatened, it
cannot be denied that, considerable progress as the Chinese have made in
the military art, they have not yet mastered some of its rudiments. All
that can be said is that the war between France and China was calculated
to teach the advisability of caution in fixing a quarrel upon China. Under
some special difficulties from the character of the war and with divided
councils at Pekin, the Chinese still gave a very good account of
themselves against one of the greatest powers of Europe.
During the progress of this struggle a coup d'etat was effected at Pekin
of which at the time it was impossible to measure the whole significance.
In July, 1884, the Chinese world was startled by the sudden fall and
disgrace of Prince Kung, who had been the most powerful man in China since
the Treaty of Pekin. A decree of the empress-regent appeared dismissing
him from all his posts and consigning him to an obscurity from which after
nine years he has not yet succeeded in emerging. The causes of his fall
are not clear, but they were probably of several distinct kinds. While he
was the leader of the peace party and the advocate of a prompt arrangement
with France, he was also an opponent of Prince Chun's desire to have a
share in the practical administration of the state, or, at least, an
obstacle in the way of its realization. Prince Chun, who was a man of an
imperious will, and who, on the death of the Eastern Empress, became the
most important personage in the palace and supreme council of the empire,
was undoubtedly the leader of the attack on Prince Kung, and the immediate
cause of his downfall. Prince Kung, who was an amiable and well
intentioned man rather than an able statesman, yielded without resistance,
and indeed he had no alternative, for he had no following at Pekin, and
his influence was very slight except among Europeans. Prince Chun then
came to the front, taking an active and prominent part in the government,
making himself president of a new board of national defense and taking up
the command of the Pekin Field Force, a specially trained body of troops
for the defense of the capital He retained possession of these posts after
his son assumed the government in person, notwithstanding the law
forbidding a father serving under his son, which has already been cited,
and he remained the real controller of Chinese policy until his sudden and
unexpected death in the first days of 1891. Some months earlier, in April,
1890, China had suffered a great loss in the Marquis Tseng, whose
diplomatic experience and knowledge of Europe might have rendered his
country infinite service in the future. He was the chosen colleague of
Prince Chun, and he is said to have gained the ear of his young sovereign.
While willing to admit the superiority of European inventions, he was also
an implicit believer in China's destiny and in her firmly holding her
place among the greatest powers of the world.
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