The Minister, Pang Wanching,
Replied, Categorically Refusing All These Requests; And, As Neither
Indemnity Nor Apology Was Offered, There Remained No Alternative But The
Inevitable And Supreme Appeal To Arms.
The troops which were to form the expedition were mainly drawn from India,
and Sir Hope Grant, who had
Not merely distinguished himself during the
Mutiny, but who had served in the first English war with China during the
operations round Canton, was appointed to the command of the army; while
Admiral Hope, strongly re-enforced in ships, retained the command of the
naval forces. A force of five batteries of artillery, six regiments of
infantry, two squadrons of cavalry, together with a body of horse and foot
from the native army of India, amounting in all to about 10,000 men, was
placed at the general's disposal in addition to the troops already in
China. The French government agreed to send another army of about two-
thirds this strength to co-operate on the Peiho, and General Montauban was
named for the command. The collection of this large expedition brought
into prominence the necessity of employing as embassador a diplomatist of
higher rank than Mr. Bruce; and accordingly, in February Lord Elgin and
Baron Gros were commissioned to again proceed to China for the purpose of
securing the ratification of their own treaty. Sir Hope Grant reached
Hongkong in March, 1860, and by his recommendation a stronger native
contingent (one Sikh regiment, four Punjab regiments, two Bombay
regiments, one Madras regiment of foot, and two irregular regiments of
Sikh cavalry, known as Fane's and Probyn's Horse; Sir John Michel and Sir
Robert Napier commanding divisions under Sir Hope Grant) was added,
raising the English force in the field to more than 13,000 men. A lease
was obtained in perpetuity, through the skillful negotiation of Mr.
Parkes, of Kowlun and Stonecutter Island, where, from their salubrious
position, it was proposed to place the troops on their arrival from India
or England. Chusan was occupied the following month without opposition by
an English brigade of 2,000 men.
The summer had commenced before the whole of the expedition assembled at
Hongkong, whence it was moved northward to Shanghai about a year after the
failure of the attack on the forts on the Peiho. A further delay was
caused by the tardiness of the French, and July had begun before the
expedition reached the Gulf of Pechihli. Then opposite opinions led to
different suggestions, and while the English advocated proceeding to
attack Pehtang, General Montauban drew up another plan of action. But the
exigencies of the alliance compelled the English, who were ready, to wait
for the French, who were not, in order that the assault might be made
simultaneously. Before that time arrived the French commander had been
brought round to the view that the proper plan of campaign was that
suggested by the English commander; viz., to attack and capture Pehtang,
whence the Taku forts might be taken in the rear. It is somewhat
remarkable to observe that no one suggested a second time endeavoring to
carry by a front attack these forts, which had in the interval since
Admiral Hope's failure been rendered more formidable.
At Pehtang the Chinese had made few preparations for defense, and nothing
of the same formidable character as at Taku. The forts on both sides of
the river were neither extensive nor well-armed. The garrison consisted
largely of Tartar cavalry, more useful for watching the movements of the
foreigners than for working artillery when exposed to the fire of the new
Armstrong guns of the English. The attacking force landed in boats and by
wading, Sir Hope Grant setting his men the example. No engagement took
place on the night of disembarkation. When morning broke, a suspicious
silence in the enemy's quarters strengthened the belief that Pehtang would
not be defended. While the garrison had resolved not to resist an attack,
they had contemplated causing their enemy as much loss as if he had been
obliged to carry the place by storm by placing shells in the magazine
which would be exploded by the moving of some gunlocks put in a spot where
they could not fail to be trodden upon. This plot, which was thoroughly in
accordance with the practices of Chinese warfare, was fortunately divulged
by a native more humane than patriotic, and Pehtang was captured and
occupied without the loss of a single man. This success at the
commencement enabled the whole of the expedition to land without further
delay or difficulty. Three days after the capture of Pehtang,
reconnoitering parties were sent out to ascertain what the Chinese were
doing, and whether they had made any preparations to oppose an advance
toward Taku or Tientsin. Four miles from Pehtang they came in sight of a
strongly intrenched camp, where several thousand men opened fire upon the
reconnoitering parties with their gingalls, and several men were wounded.
The object being only to find out what the Celestial army was doing, and
where it was, the Europeans withdrew on discovering the proximity of so
strong a force. The great difficulty was to discover a way of getting from
Pehtang on to some of the main roads leading to the Peiho; for the whole
of the surrounding country had been under water, and was more or less
impassable. In fact, the region round Pehtang consisted of nothing but
mud, while the one road, an elevated causeway, was blocked by the
fortified camp just mentioned as having been discovered by the
reconnoitering party. A subsequent reconnaissance, conducted by Colonel
(now Lord) Wolseley, revealed the presence of a cart-track which might
prove available for the march of troops. This track was turned to
advantage for the purpose of taking the Chinese position in flank, and to
Sir Robert Napier's division was assigned this, as it proved, difficult
operation. When the maneuver of out-flanking had been satisfactorily
accomplished, the attack was commenced in front.
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