I repeat the dictum
expressed in the introduction; if England is the ally of Turkey and she
can depend upon the integrity of that defensive alliance against Russia,
there is no need for any station that incurs the obligations of Cyprus;
all the Turkish ports would be open to our ships. The occupation of
Cyprus would therefore suggest that a far-seeing government had doubted
the integrity of Turkey, and had therefore determined to secure a
pied-a-terre in a strategical position that would command the east of
the Mediterranean. Upon this point opinions will again differ, and I
quote the words of one of the most experienced statesmen and an
ex-minister of the Upper House, who writes:--
"The objections to Cyprus as a military and naval station are shortly
these. It will oblige us to establish a garrison, and therefore to
increase and divide our forces in the Mediterranean. There must be
barracks, hospitals, store-houses, &c. After all this expenditure Cyprus
will weaken rather than strengthen our power.
"Famagousta may be made a good harbour; but how can it be defended? The
ships will not be, as in Malta, defended by batteries projecting far
beyond the anchorage; Famagousta will require ships of war to defend it,
or batteries constructed on the breakwater--a most costly undertaking.
As a coaling-station it is not wanted, because colliers accompanying the
fleet are much more convenient.
