Britain," are
political arrangements based upon self-interest, for which they owe us
no personal gratitude; in the hour of their distress we declined
material assistance, but seized the opportunity for occupying one of
their important positions--Cyprus; their only satisfaction remained in
the knowledge that they had "done us" in the bargain. We have quickly
discovered the painful fact, and one party to the alliance already feels
aggrieved, and seeks for an alteration in the terms of the Convention.
I cannot conceive any more dangerous risk to friendships than an
interference in the private affairs of individuals, or in the public
administration of governments. We have assumed the enormous
responsibility of the Protectorate of Asia Minor under conditions which
we must know will never be fulfilled; Turkey promises to reform the
abuses of her internal administration, &c. &c.! Anybody who knows Turkey
must be aware that such a reform is impossible: the honest
administrative material does not exist in the Ottoman Empire, and the
promises of the Porte have been tolerably exemplified since the Crimean
war. Under these circumstances the Anglo-Turkish alliance is in a
questionable position. We have assumed the Protectorate of Asia Minor
conditionally; we occupy Cyprus conditionally; and should Turkey fail to
perform her promises in the government of her Asiatic provinces, we have
a back-door for an escape from our onerous engagement. Unfortunately
English diplomacy is celebrated for back-doors. In the Berlin Treaty we
entered Cyprus through a back-door, and we may possibly retire by the
same exit; but there is little doubt that the Turk does not believe in
our professed determination to defend him by force of arms in the event
of a future conflict between Russia and the Sultan in Asia Minor.
Notwithstanding our professed sincerity, the Turk has become an
unbeliever in the faith of treaties and political engagements; he
believes most thoroughly that should "British interests" require the
sacrifice of honour, England will somehow or other manage to slip
through the Ottoman fingers, and escape from her alliance when called
upon to meet Russia in the field. Of course the ignorant Turk is wrong,
and his suspicions are unfounded.
With a mutual want of confidence in the integrity of an alliance, it
would hardly be surprising should the Sultan attach more importance to
the practical force of Russia than to the moral rectitude and high
political principles of England. The power of Russia has been felt, and
the position of European Turkey is that of a dislocated and dismembered
Empire, which upon the next explosion will reduce the Sultan to the
small extremity on the Bosphorus between Constantinople and the lines of
Tchataldja. Turkey will cease to be a European Power, and upon the
outbreak of the next Russian war she will be discovered as represented
by Asia Minor, in which the claws of the Eagle are already fixed in the
vital points--Batoum, Kars, and Ardahan. A Russian advance from those
positions will, according to the terms of the alliance, compel Great
Britain to exhibit herself as the champion of Turkish rights in armed
defence of Asia Minor.
When we reflect upon the prodigious responsibility of such an alliance
with a crippled Power that has been completely subdued, the victorious
army of the Czar retired from the gates of the capital, the nation
bankrupt beyond all hopes of liquidation, the various states in chronic
discontent both in Europe and in Asia, and the claims of Greece
threatening to explode the combustible materials, we may well appreciate
the back-door that has so frequently afforded a retreat from an
untenable position.
If it is necessary for England to form a defensive alliance with Turkey
as a crippled Power, with Russia actually established in Asia Minor, why
should we have waited until Turkey was mortally stricken, when by an
earlier alliance we could have at least saved Asia Minor in its
integrity? We have let the lion into the house with a boast that we will
turn him out in the event of further roaring, instead of having
prevented his entry in the first instance.
Under all the circumstances of the risk and responsibility assumed by
England in a defensive alliance with Turkey under the title of a
Protectorate of Asia Minor, the Cyprus Convention is highly unfavourable
in its conditions. The island should have been simply conveyed from
Turkey and transferred as a free gift to England, as a position
necessary for her occupation under the probable contingencies of the
Anglo-Turkish alliance, and it should have at once become a portion of
the British Empire. Had this course been pursued a mutual confidence
would have been established; on the other hand, all back-doors would
have been sealed, as we should have been bound by all the laws of honour
to defend Turkey to the last extremity in Asia Minor.
Russia, in Kars, occupies a position which affords an unbounded horizon
for political intrigue. The various Turkish Pachas and other district
authorities throughout Asia Minor have witnessed the irresistible
advance of Russia, while England stood afar off, and only assisted
Turkey with her good counsel. The same authorities now see Russia in
possession, while England, who has not assisted during the bloody
struggle, appears upon the scene as a political Paul Pry, and intrudes
upon the mysteries that surround Pachas, Governors, and various
functionaries, who, from the highest to the lowest official, mainly
exist upon extortion.
It is hardly necessary to explain that British assistance in such a form
will be most unwelcome, and will increase our reputation for
intermeddling while in the hour of extremity we withhold the required
aid. Any interference on our part with the administration of Asia Minor
will cause an extreme jealousy and suspicion throughout all classes of
Turkish officials, who will be rendered the more amenable to the guiles
of Russian intrigues from Kars and Ardahan.
