Questions Of Taxation Are
Referred To The Finance Committee Before They Are Discussed In The
House; And The House, When It Goes Into Such Discussion, Has Before
It The Report Of The Committee.
In this way very much of the work
of the legislature is done by branches of each House, and by
selected men whose time and intellects are devoted to special
subjects.
It is easy to see that much time and useless debate may
be thus saved; and I am disposed to believe that this system of
committees has worked efficiently and beneficially. The mode of
selection of the members has been so contrived as to give to each
political party that amount of preponderance in each committee which
such party holds in the House. If the Democrats have in the Senate
a majority, it would be within their power to vote none but
Democrats into the Committee on Finance; but this would be
manifestly unjust to the Republican party, and the injustice would
itself frustrate the object of the party in power; therefore the
Democrats simply vote to themselves a majority in each committee,
keeping to themselves as great a preponderance in the committee as
they have in the whole House, and arranging also that the chairman
of the committee shall belong to their own party. By these
committees the chief legislative measures of the country are
originated and inaugurated, as they are with us by the ministers of
the Crown; and the chairman of each committee is supposed to have a
certain amicable relation with that minister who presides over the
office with which his committee is connected. Mr. Sumner is at
present chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and he is
presumed to be in connection with Mr. Seward, who, as Secretary of
State, has the management of the foreign relations of the
government.
But it seems to me that this supposed connection between the
committees and the ministers is only a makeshift, showing by its
existence the absolute necessity of close communication between the
executive and the legislative, but showing also by its imperfections
the great want of some better method of communication. In the first
place, the chairman of the committee is in no way bound to hold any
communication with the minister. He is simply a Senator, and as
such has no ministerial duties and can have none. He holds no
appointment under the President, and has no palpable connection with
the executive. And then, it is quite as likely that he may be
opposed in politics to the minister as that he may agree with him.
If the two be opposed to each other on general politics, it may be
presumed that they cannot act together in union on one special
subject; nor, whether they act in union or do not so act, can either
have any authority over the other. The minister is not responsible
to Congress, nor is the chairman of the committee in any way bound
to support the minister. It is presumed that the chairman must know
the minister's secrets; but the chairman may be bound by party
considerations to use those secrets against the minister.
The system of committees appears to me to be good as regards the
work of legislation. It seems well adapted to effect economy of
time and the application of special men to special services. But I
am driven to think that that connection between the chairmen of the
committees and the ministers which I have attempted to describe is
an arrangement very imperfect in itself, but plainly indicating the
necessity of some such close relation between the executive and the
legislature of the United States as does exist in the political
system of Great Britain. With us the Queen's minister has a greater
weight in Parliament than the President's minister could hold in
Congress, because the Queen is bound to employ a minister in whom
the Parliament has confidence. As soon as such confidence ceases,
the minister ceases to be minister. As the Crown has no politics of
its own, it is simply necessary that the minister of the day should
hold the politics of the people as testified by their
representatives. The machinery of the President's government cannot
be made to work after this fashion. The President himself is a
political officer, and the country is bound to bear with his
politics for four years, whatever those politics may be. The
ministry which he selects, on coming to his seat, will probably
represent a majority in Congress, seeing that the same suffrages
which have elected the President will also have elected the
Congress. But there exists no necessity on the part of the
President to employ ministers who shall carry with them the support
of Congress. If, however, the minister sat in Congress - if it were
required of each minister that he should have a seat either in one
House or in the other - the President would, I think, find himself
constrained to change a ministry in which Congress should decline to
confide. It might not be so at first, but there would be a tendency
in that direction.
The governing powers do not rest exclusively with the President or
with the President and his ministers; they are shared in a certain
degree with the Senate, which sits from time to time in executive
session, laying aside at such periods its legislative character. It
is this executive authority which lends so great a dignity to the
Senate, gives it the privilege of preponderating over the other
House, and makes it the political safeguard of the nation. The
questions of government as to which the Senate is empowered to
interfere are soon told. All treaties made by the President must be
sanctioned by the Senate; and all appointments made by the President
must be confirmed by the Senate. The list is short; and one is
disposed to think, when first hearing it, that the thing itself does
not amount to much.
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