But, In Fact, The Burden At Present Is
Borne By No One.
The government of the United States is not in
truth responsible either to the people or to Congress.
But these ministers, if it be desired that they shall have weight in
the country, should sit in Congress either as Senators or as
Representatives. That they cannot so sit without an amendment of
the Constitution, I have explained in the previous chapter; and any
such amendment cannot be very readily made. Without such seats they
cannot really share the responsibility of the President, or be in
any degree amenable to public opinion for the advice which they give
in their public functions. It will be said that the Constitution
has expressly intended that they should not be responsible, and
such, no doubt, has been the case. But the Constitution, good as it
is, cannot be taken as perfect. The government has become greater
than seems to have been contemplated when that code was drawn up.
It has spread itself as it were over a wider surface, and has
extended to matters which it was not necessary then to touch. That
theory of governing by the means of little men was very well while
the government itself was small. A President and his clerks may
have sufficed when there were from thirteen to eighteen States;
while there were no Territories, or none at least that required
government; while the population was still below five millions;
while a standing army was an evil not known and not feared; while
foreign politics was a troublesome embroglio in which it was quite
unnecessary that the United States should take a part. Now there
are thirty-four States. The territories populated by American
citizens stretch from the States on the Atlantic to those on the
Pacific. There is a population of thirty million souls. At the
present moment the United States are employing more soldiers than
any other nation, and have acknowledged the necessity of maintaining
a large army even when the present troubles shall be over. In
addition to this the United States have occasion for the use of
statecraft with all the great kingdoms of Europe. That theory of
ruling by little men will not do much longer. It will be well that
they should bring forth their big men and put them in the place of
rulers.
The President has at present seven ministers. They are the
Secretary of State, who is supposed to have the direction of foreign
affairs; the Secretary of the Treasury, who answers to our
Chancellor of the Exchequer; the Secretaries of the Army and of the
Navy; the Minister of the Interior; the Attorney-General; and the
Postmaster-General. If these officers were allowed to hold seats in
one House or the other - or rather if the President were enjoined to
place in these offices men who were known as members of Congress,
not only would the position of the President's ministers be enhanced
and their weight increased, but the position also of Congress would
be enhanced and the weight of Congress would be increased. I may,
perhaps, best exemplify this by suggesting what would be the effect
on our Parliament by withdrawing from it the men who at the present
moment - or at any moment - form the Queen's cabinet. I will not say
that by adding to Congress the men who usually form the President's
cabinet, a weight would be given equal to that which the withdrawal
of the British cabinet would take from the British Parliament. I
cannot pay that compliment to the President's choice of servants.
But the relationship between Congress and the President's ministers
would gradually come to resemble that which exists between
Parliament and the Queen's ministers. The Secretaries of State and
of the Treasury would after awhile obtain that honor of leading the
Houses which is exercised by our high political officers, and the
dignity added to the positions would make the places worthy of the
acceptance of great men. It is hardly so at present. The career of
one of the President's ministers is not a very high career as things
now stand; nor is the man supposed to have achieved much who has
achieved that position. I think it would be otherwise if the
ministers were the leaders of the legislative houses. To Congress
itself would be given the power of questioning and ultimately of
controlling these ministers. The power of the President would no
doubt be diminished as that of Congress would be increased. But an
alteration in that direction is in itself desirable. It is the
fault of the present system of government in the United States that
the President has too much of power and weight, while the Congress
of the nation lacks power and weight. As matters now stand,
Congress has not that dignity of position which it should hold; and
it is without it because it is not endowed with that control over
the officers of the government which our Parliament is enabled to
exercise.
The want of this close connection with Congress and the President's
ministers has been so much felt that it has been found necessary to
create a medium of communication. This has been done by a system
which has now become a recognized part of the machinery of the
government, but which is, I believe, founded on no regularly
organized authority; at any rate, no provision is made for it in the
Constitution, nor, as far as I am aware, has it been established by
any special enactment or written rule. Nevertheless, I believe I am
justified in saying that it has become a recognized link in the
system of government adopted by the United States. In each House
standing committees are named, to which are delegated the special
consideration of certain affairs of State. There are, for instance,
Committees of Foreign Affairs, of Finance, the Judiciary Committee,
and others of a similar nature. To these committees are referred
all questions which come before the House bearing on the special
subject to which each is devoted.
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