It Also Gives To The Senate A Considerable
Control Over The Foreign Relations Of The Government.
I believe
that this power is often used, and that by it the influence of the
Senate is raised much above that of the Lower House.
This influence
is increased again by the advantage of that superior statecraft and
political knowledge which the six years of the Senator gives him
over the two years of the Representative. The tried Representative,
moreover, very frequently blossoms into a Senator but a Senator does
not frequently fade into a Representative. Such occasionally is the
case, and it is not even unconstitutional for an ex-President to
reappear in either House. Mr. Benton, after thirty years' service
in the Senate, sat in the House of Representatives. Mr. Crittenden,
who was returned as Senator by Kentucky, I think seven times, now
sits in the Lower House; and John Quincy Adams appeared as a
Representative from Massachusetts after he had filled the
presidential chair.
And, moreover, the Senate of the United States is not debarred from
an interference with money bills, as the House of Lords is debarred
with us. "All bills for raising revenue," says the seventh section
of the first article of the Constitution, "shall originate with the
House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with
amendments as on other bills." By this the Senate is enabled to
have an authority in the money matters of the nation almost equal to
that held by the Lower House - an authority quite sufficient to
preserve to it the full influence of its other powers. With us the
House of Commons is altogether in the ascendant, because it holds
and jealously keeps to itself the exclusive command of the public
purse.
Congress can levy custom duties in the United States, and always has
done so; hitherto the national revenue has been exclusively raised
from custom duties. It cannot levy duties on exports. It can levy
excise duties, and is now doing so; hitherto it has not done so. It
can levy direct taxes, such as an income tax and a property tax; it
hitherto has not done so, but now must do so. It must do so, I
think I am justified in saying; but its power of doing this is so
hampered by constitutional enactment, that it would seem that the
Constitution as regards this heading must be altered before any
scheme can be arranged by which a moderately just income tax can be
levied and collected. This difficulty I have already mentioned, but
perhaps it will be well that I should endeavor to make the subject
more plain. It is specially declared: "That all duties, imposts,
and excises shall be uniform throughout the united States." And
again: "That no capitation or other direct tax shall be laid, unless
in proportion to the census or enumeration hereinbefore directed to
be taken." And again, in the words before quoted: "Representatives
and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which
shall be included in this Union, according to their respective
numbers." By these repeated rules it has been intended to decree
that the separate States shall bear direct taxation according to
their population and the consequent number of their Representatives;
and this intention has been made so clear that no direct taxation
can be levied in opposition to it without an evident breach of the
Constitution. To explain the way in which this will work, I will
name the two States of Rhode Island and Iowa as opposed to each
other, and the two States of Massachusetts and Indiana as opposed to
each other. Rhode Island and Massachusetts are wealthy Atlantic
States, containing, as regards enterprise and commercial success,
the cream of the population of the United States. Comparing them in
the ratio of population, I believe that they are richer than any
other States. They return between them thirteen Representatives,
Rhode Island sending two and Massachusetts eleven. Iowa and Indiana
also send thirteen Representatives, Iowa sending two, and being thus
equal to Rhode Island; Indiana sending eleven, and being thus equal
to Massachusetts. Iowa and Indiana are Western States; and though I
am not prepared to say that they are the poorest States of the
Union, I can assert that they are exactly opposite in their
circumstances to Rhode Island and Massachusetts. The two Atlantic
States of New England are old established, rich, and commercial.
The two Western States I have named are full of new immigrants, are
comparatively poor, and are agricultural. Nevertheless any direct
taxation levied on those in the East and on those in the West must
be equal in its weight. Iowa must pay as much as Rhode Island;
Indiana must pay as much as Massachusetts. But Rhode Island and
Massachusetts could pay, without the sacrifice of any comfort to its
people, without any sensible suffering, an amount of direct taxation
which would crush the States of Iowa and Indiana - which indeed no
tax gatherer could collect out of those States. Rhode Island and
Massachusetts could with their ready money buy Iowa and Indiana; and
yet the income tax to be collected from the poor States is to be the
same in amount as that collected from the rich States. Within each
individual State the total amount of income tax or of other direct
taxation to be levied from that State may be apportioned as the
State may think fit; but an income tax of two per cent. on Rhode
Island would probably produce more than an income tax of ten per
cent. in Iowa; whereas Rhode Island could pay an income tax of ten
per cent. easier than could Iowa one of two per cent.
It would in fact appear that the Constitution as at present framed
is fatal to all direct taxation. Any law for the collection of
direct taxation levied under the Constitution would produce
internecine quarrel between the Western States and those which
border on the Atlantic. The Western States would not submit to the
taxation.
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