With Us The Queen's Minister Has A Greater
Weight In Parliament Than The President's Minister Could Hold In
Congress, Because The Queen Is Bound To Employ A Minister In Whom
The Parliament Has Confidence.
As soon as such confidence ceases,
the minister ceases to be minister.
As the Crown has no politics of
its own, it is simply necessary that the minister of the day should
hold the politics of the people as testified by their
representatives. The machinery of the President's government cannot
be made to work after this fashion. The President himself is a
political officer, and the country is bound to bear with his
politics for four years, whatever those politics may be. The
ministry which he selects, on coming to his seat, will probably
represent a majority in Congress, seeing that the same suffrages
which have elected the President will also have elected the
Congress. But there exists no necessity on the part of the
President to employ ministers who shall carry with them the support
of Congress. If, however, the minister sat in Congress - if it were
required of each minister that he should have a seat either in one
House or in the other - the President would, I think, find himself
constrained to change a ministry in which Congress should decline to
confide. It might not be so at first, but there would be a tendency
in that direction.
The governing powers do not rest exclusively with the President or
with the President and his ministers; they are shared in a certain
degree with the Senate, which sits from time to time in executive
session, laying aside at such periods its legislative character. It
is this executive authority which lends so great a dignity to the
Senate, gives it the privilege of preponderating over the other
House, and makes it the political safeguard of the nation. The
questions of government as to which the Senate is empowered to
interfere are soon told. All treaties made by the President must be
sanctioned by the Senate; and all appointments made by the President
must be confirmed by the Senate. The list is short; and one is
disposed to think, when first hearing it, that the thing itself does
not amount to much. But it does amount to very much; it enables the
Senate to fetter the President, if the Senate should be so inclined,
both as regards foreign politics and home politics. A Secretary for
Foreign Affairs at Washington may write what dispatches he pleases
without reference to the Senate; but the Senate interferes before
those dispatches can have resulted in any fact which may be
detrimental to the nation. It is not only that the Senate is
responsible for such treaties as are made, but that the President is
deterred from the making of treaties for which the Senate would
decline to make itself responsible. Even though no treaty should
ever be refused its sanction by the Senate, the protecting power of
the Senate in that matter would not on that account have been less
necessary or less efficacious.
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