This is the question I
purpose to consider in the following chapter.
CHAPTER XVIII
ALL punishments or penal remedies for crime, except capital
punishment, may be considered from two points of view:
First, as they regard Society; secondly, as they regard the
offender.
Where capital punishment is resorted to, the sole end in view
is the protection of Society. The malefactor being put to
death, there can be no thought of his amendment. And so far
as this particular criminal is concerned, Society is
henceforth in safety.
But (looking to the individual), as equal security could be
obtained by his imprisonment for life, the extreme measure of
putting him to death needs justification. This is found in
the assumption that death being the severest of all
punishments now permissible, no other penalty is so
efficacious in preventing the crime or crimes for which it is
inflicted. Is the assumption borne out by facts, or by
inference?
For facts we naturally turn to statistics. Switzerland
abolished capital punishment in 1874; but cases of
premeditated murder having largely increased during the next
five years, it was restored by Federal legislation in 1879.
Still there is nothing conclusive to be inferred from this
fact. We must seek for guidance elsewhere.
Reverting to the above assumption, we must ask: First, Is
the death punishment the severest of all evils, and to what
extent does the fear of it act as a preventive? Secondly, Is
it true that no other punishment would serve as powerfully in
preventing murder by intimidation?
Is punishment by death the most dreaded of all evils? 'This
assertion,' says Bentham, 'is true with respect to the
majority of mankind; it is not true with respect to the
greatest criminals.' It is pretty certain that a malefactor
steeped in crime, living in extreme want, misery and
apprehension, must, if he reflects at all, contemplate a
violent end as an imminent possibility. He has no better
future before him, and may easily come to look upon death
with brutal insensibility and defiance. The indifference
exhibited by the garrotted man getting up to adjust his chair
is probably common amongst criminals of his type.
Again, take such a crime as that of the Cuban's: the passion
which leads to it is the fiercest and most ungovernable which
man is subject to. Sexual jealousy also is one of the most
frequent causes of murder. So violent is this passion that
the victim of it is often quite prepared to sacrifice life
rather than forego indulgence, or allow another to supplant
him; both men and women will gloat over the murder of a
rival, and gladly accept death as its penalty, rather than
survive the possession of the desired object by another.
Further, in addition to those who yield to fits of passion,
there is a class whose criminal promptings are hereditary:
