It Is
The Fact That They Were Skirmishes Which Succeeded In Their Object
Which Has Given Them An Importance Which Is Exaggerated.
At the
same time they may mark the beginning of a new military era, for
they drove home the fact - only too badly learned by us - that it is
the rifle and not the drill which makes the soldier.
It is
bewildering that after such an experience the British military
authorities continued to serve out only three hundred cartridges a
year for rifle practice, and that they still encouraged that
mechanical volley firing which destroys all individual aim. With
the experience of the first Boer war behind them, little was done,
either in tactics or in musketry, to prepare the soldier for the
second. The value of the mounted rifleman, the shooting with
accuracy at unknown ranges, the art of taking cover - all were
equally neglected.
The defeat at Majuba Hill was followed by the complete surrender of
the Gladstonian Government, an act which was either the most
pusillanimous or the most magnanimous in recent history. It is hard
for the big man to draw away from the small before blows are struck
but when the big man has been knocked down three times it is harder
still. An overwhelming British force was in the field, and the
General declared that he held the enemy in the hollow of his hand.
Our military calculations have been falsified before now by these
farmers, and it may be that the task of Wood and Roberts would have
been harder than they imagined; but on paper, at least, it looked
as if the enemy could be crushed without difficulty. So the public
thought, and yet they consented to the upraised sword being stayed.
With them, as apart from the politicians, the motive was
undoubtedly a moral and Christian one. They considered that the
annexation of the Transvaal had evidently been an injustice, that
the farmers had a right to the freedom for which they fought, and
that it was an unworthy thing for a great nation to continue an
unjust war for the sake of a military revenge. It was the height of
idealism, and the result has not been such as to encourage its
repetition.
An armistice was concluded on March 5th, 1881, which led up to a
peace on the 23rd of the same month. The Government, after yielding
to force what it had repeatedly refused to friendly
representations, made a clumsy compromise in their settlement. A
policy of idealism and Christian morality should have been thorough
if it were to be tried at all. It was obvious that if the
annexation were unjust, then the Transvaal should have reverted to
the condition in which it was before the annexation, as defined by
the Sand River Convention. But the Government for some reason would
not go so far as this. They niggled and quibbled and bargained
until the State was left as a curious hybrid thing such as the
world has never seen. It was a republic which was part of the
system of a monarchy, dealt with by the Colonial Office, and
included under the heading of 'Colonies' in the news columns of the
'Times.' It was autonomous, and yet subject to some vague
suzerainty, the limits of which no one has ever been able to
define. Altogether, in its provisions and in its omissions, the
Convention of Pretoria appears to prove that our political affairs
were as badly conducted as our military in this unfortunate year of
1881.
It was evident from the first that so illogical and contentious an
agreement could not possibly prove to be a final settlement, and
indeed the ink of the signatures was hardly dry before an agitation
was on foot for its revision. The Boers considered, and with
justice, that if they were to be left as undisputed victors in the
war then they should have the full fruits of victory. On the other
hand, the English-speaking colonies had their allegiance tested to
the uttermost. The proud Anglo-Celtic stock is not accustomed to be
humbled, and yet they found themselves through the action of the
home Government converted into members of a beaten race. It was
very well for the citizen of London to console his wounded pride by
the thought that he had done a magnanimous action, but it was
different with the British colonist of Durban or Cape Town, who by
no act of his own, and without any voice in the settlement, found
himself humiliated before his Dutch neighbour. An ugly feeling of
resentment was left behind, which might perhaps have passed away
had the Transvaal accepted the settlement in the spirit in which it
was meant, but which grew more and more dangerous as during
eighteen years our people saw, or thought that they saw, that one
concession led always to a fresh demand, and that the Dutch
republics aimed not merely at equality, but at dominance in South
Africa. Professor Bryce, a friendly critic, after a personal
examination of the country and the question, has left it upon
record that the Boers saw neither generosity nor humanity in our
conduct, but only fear. An outspoken race, they conveyed their
feelings to their neighbours. Can it be wondered at that South
Africa has been in a ferment ever since, and that the British
Africander has yearned with an intensity of feeling unknown in
England for the hour of revenge?
The Government of the Transvaal after the war was left in the hands
of a triumvirate, but after one year Kruger became President, an
office which he continued to hold for eighteen years. His career as
ruler vindicates the wisdom of that wise but unwritten provision of
the American Constitution by which there is a limit to the tenure
of this office. Continued rule for half a generation must turn a
man into an autocrat. The old President has said himself, in his
homely but shrewd way, that when one gets a good ox to lead the
team it is a pity to change him.
Enter page number
PreviousNext
Page 7 of 222
Words from 6128 to 7147
of 225456