But, On The
Other Hand, Between These Hills There Lie Wide Stretches Of The
Green Or Russet Savanna, The Noblest Field That A Horseman Or A
Horse Gunner Could Wish.
The riflemen clung to the hills, French's
troopers circled warily upon the plain, gradually contracting the
Boer position by threatening to cut off this or that outlying
kopje, and so the enemy was slowly herded into Colesberg.
The small
but mobile British force covered a very large area, and hardly a
day passed that one or other part of it did not come in contact
with the enemy. With one regiment of infantry (the Berkshires) to
hold the centre, his hard-riding Tasmanians, New Zealanders, and
Australians, with the Scots Greys, the Inniskillings, and the
Carabineers, formed an elastic but impenetrable screen to cover the
Colony. They were aided by two batteries, O and R, of Horse
Artillery. Every day General French rode out and made a close
personal examination of the enemy's position, while his scouts and
outposts were instructed to maintain the closest possible touch.
On December 30th the enemy abandoned Rensburg, which had been their
advanced post, and concentrated at Colesberg, upon which French
moved his force up and seized Rensburg. The very next day, December
31st, he began a vigorous and long-continued series of operations.
At five o'clock on Sunday evening he moved out of Rensburg camp,
with R and half of O batteries R.H.A., the 10th Hussars, the
Inniskillings, and the Berkshires, to take up a position on the
west of Colesberg. At the same time Colonel Porter, with the
half-battery of O, his own regiment (the Carabineers), and the New
Zealand Mounted Rifles, left camp at two on the Monday morning and
took a position on the enemy's left flank. The Berkshires under
Major McCracken seized the hill, driving a Boer picket off it, and
the Horse enfiladed the enemy's right flank, and after a risky
artillery duel succeeded in silencing his guns. Next morning,
however (January 2nd, 1900), it was found that the Boers, strongly
reinforced, were back near their old positions, and French had to
be content to hold them and to wait for more troops.
These were not long in coming, for the Suffolk Regiment had
arrived, followed by the Composite Regiment (chosen from the
Household Cavalry) and the 4th Battery R.F.A. The Boers, however,
had also been reinforced, and showed great energy in their effort
to break the cordon which was being drawn round them. Upon the 4th
a determined effort was made by about a thousand of them under
General Schoeman to turn the left flank of the British, and at dawn
it was actually found that they had eluded the vigilance of the
outposts and had established themselves upon a hill to the rear of
the position. They were shelled off of it, however, by the guns of
O Battery, and in their retreat across the plain they were pursued
by the 10th Hussars and by one squadron of the Inniskillings, who
cut off some of the fugitives. At the same time, De Lisle with his
mounted infantry carried the position which they had originally
held. In this successful and well-managed action the Boer loss was
ninety, and we took in addition twenty-one prisoners. Our own
casualties amounted only to six killed, including Major Harvey of
the 10th, and to fifteen wounded.
Encouraged by this success an attempt was made by the Suffolk
Regiment to carry a hill which formed the key of the enemy's
position. The town of Colesberg lies in a basin surrounded by a
ring of kopjes, and the possession by us of any one of them would
have made the place untenable. The plan has been ascribed to
Colonel Watson of the Suffolks, but it is time that some protest
should be raised against this devolution of responsibility upon
subordinates in the event of failure. When success has crowned our
arms we have been delighted to honour our general; but when our
efforts end in failure our attention is called to Colonel Watson,
Colonel Long, or Colonel Thorneycroft. It is fairer to state that
in this instance General French ordered Colonel Watson to make a
night attack upon the hill.
The result was disastrous. At midnight four companies in canvas
shoes or in their stocking feet set forth upon their venture, and
just before dawn they found themselves upon the slope of the hill.
They were in a formation of quarter column with files extended to
two paces; H Company was leading. When half-way up a warm fire was
opened upon them in the darkness. Colonel Watson gave the order to
retire, intending, as it is believed, that the men should get under
the shelter of the dead ground which they had just quitted, but his
death immediately afterwards left matters in a confused condition.
The night was black, the ground broken, a hail of bullets whizzing
through the ranks. Companies got mixed in the darkness and
contradictory orders were issued. The leading company held its
ground, though each of the officers, Brett, Carey, and Butler, was
struck down. The other companies had retired, however, and the dawn
found this fringe of men, most of them wounded, lying under the
very rifles of the Boers. Even then they held out for some time,
but they could neither advance, retire, or stay where they were
without losing lives to no purpose, so the survivors were compelled
to surrender. There is better evidence here than at Magersfontein
that the enemy were warned and ready. Every one of the officers
engaged, from the Colonel to the boy subaltern, was killed,
wounded, or taken. Eleven officers and one hundred and fifty men
were our losses in this unfortunate but not discreditable affair,
which proves once more how much accuracy and how much secrecy is
necessary for a successful night attack. Four companies of the
regiment were sent down to Port Elizabeth to re-officer, but the
arrival of the 1st Essex enabled French to fill the gap which had
been made in his force.
Enter page number
PreviousNext
Page 72 of 222
Words from 72213 to 73237
of 225456
