A more unsatisfactory and in some ways
inexplicable action is not to be found in the range of British
military history. And the fuller the light which has been poured
upon it, the more extraordinary does the battle appear. There are a
preface and a sequel to the action which have put a severe strain
upon the charity which the British public has always shown that it
is prepared to extend to a defeated General. The preface is that
General Buller sent word to General White that he proposed to
attack upon the 17th, while the actual attack was delivered upon
the 15th, so that the garrison was not prepared to make that
demonstration which might have prevented the besiegers from sending
important reinforcements to Botha, had he needed them. The sequel
is more serious. Losing all heart at his defeat, General Buller,
although he had been officially informed that White had provisions
for seventy days, sent a heliogram advising the surrender of the
garrison. White's first reply, which deserves to live with the
anecdote of Nelson's telescope at his blind eye, was to the effect
that he believed the enemy had been tampering with Buller's
messages. To this Buller despatched an amended message, which with
Sir George White's reply, is here appended:
Message of December 16th, as altered by that of December 17th,
1899.
'I tried Colenso yesterday, but failed; the enemy is too strong for
my force except with siege operations, and these will take one full
month to prepare. Can you last so long?
'How many days can you hold out? I suggest you firing away as much
ammunition as you can, and making best terms you can. I can remain
here if you have alternative suggestion, but unaided I cannot break
in. I find my infantry cannot fight more than ten miles from camp,
and then only if water can be got, and it is scarce here. Whatever
happens, recollect to burn your cipher, decipher, and code books,
and all deciphered messages.'
From Sir G. White to Sir R. Buller. December 16th, 1899.
'Yours of today received and understood. My suggestion is that you
take up strongest available position that will enable you to keep
touch of the enemy and harass him constantly with artillery fire,
and in other ways as much as possible. I can make food last for
much longer than a month, and will not think of making terms till I
am forced to. You may have hit enemy harder than you think. All our
native spies report that your artillery fire made considerable
impression on enemy. Have your losses been very heavy? If you lose
touch of enemy, it will immensely increase his opportunities of
crushing me, and have worst effect elsewhere. While you are in
touch with him and in communication with me, he has both of our
forces to reckon with. Make every effort to get reinforcements as
early as possible, including India, and enlist every man in both
colonies who will serve and can ride. Things may look brighter. The
loss of 12,000 men here would be a heavy blow to England. We must
not yet think of it. I fear I could not cut my way to you. Enteric
fever is increasing alarmingly here. There are now 180 cases, all
within last month. Answer fully. I am keeping everything secret for
the present till I know your plans.'
Much allowance is to be made for a man who is staggering under the
mental shock of defeat and the physical exertions which Buller had
endured. That the Government made such allowance is clear from the
fact that he was not instantly recalled. And yet the cold facts are
that we have a British General, at the head of 25,000 men,
recommending another General, at the head of 12,000 men only twelve
miles off, to lay down his arms to an army which was certainly very
inferior in numbers to the total British force; and this because he
had once been defeated, although he knew that there was still time
for the whole resources of the Empire to be poured into Natal in
order to prevent so shocking a disaster. Such is a plain statement
of the advice which Buller gave and which White rejected. For the
instant the fate not only of South Africa but even, as I believe,
of the Empire hung upon the decision of the old soldier in
Ladysmith, who had to resist the proposals of his own General as
sternly as the attacks of the enemy. He who sorely needed help and
encouragement became, as his message shows, the helper and the
encourager. It was a tremendous test, and Sir George White came
through it with a staunchness and a loyalty which saved us not only
from overwhelming present disaster, but from a hideous memory which
must have haunted British military annals for centuries to come.
CHAPTER 12.
THE DARK HOUR.
The week which extended from December 10th to December 17th, 1899,
was the blackest one known during our generation, and the most
disastrous for British arms during the century. We had in the short
space of seven days lost, beyond all extenuation or excuse, three
separate actions. No single defeat was of vital importance in
itself, but the cumulative effect, occurring as they did to each of
the main British forces in South Africa, was very great. The total
loss amounted to about three thousand men and twelve guns, while
the indirect effects in the way of loss of prestige to ourselves
and increased confidence and more numerous recruits to our enemy
were incalculable.
It is singular to glance at the extracts from the European press at
that time and to observe the delight and foolish exultation with
which our reverses were received.
