The ultimate blame does not
rest with the man who failed with the two regiments, but with those
who gave him inadequate means for the work which he had to do. And
in this estimate of means our military authorities, our
politicians, and our public were all in the first instance equally
mistaken.
Lord Roberts's plan was absolutely simple, and yet, had it been
carried out as conceived, absolutely effective. It was not his
intention to go near any of that entanglement of ditch and wire
which had been so carefully erected for his undoing. The weaker
party, if it be wise, atones for its weakness by entrenchments. The
stronger party, if it be wise, leaves the entrenchments alone and
uses its strength to go round them. Lord Roberts meant to go round.
With his immense preponderance of men and guns the capture or
dispersal of the enemy's army might be reduced to a certainty. Once
surrounded, they must either come out into the open or they must
surrender.
On March 6th the cavalry were brought across the river, and in the
early morning of March 7th they were sent off in the darkness to
sweep round the left wing of the Boers and to establish themselves
on the line of their retreat. Kelly-Kenny's Division (6th) had
orders to follow and support this movement. Meanwhile Tucker was to
push straight along the southern bank of the river, though we may
surmise that his instructions were, in case of resistance, not to
push his attack home. Colvile's 9th Division, with part of the
naval brigade, were north of the river, the latter to shell the
drifts in case the Boers tried to cross, and the infantry to
execute a turning movement which would correspond with that of the
cavalry on the other flank.
The plan of action was based, however, upon one supposition which
proved to be fallacious. It was that after having prepared so
elaborate a position the enemy would stop at least a little time to
defend it. Nothing of the sort occurred, however, and on the
instant that they realised that the cavalry was on their flank they
made off. The infantry did not fire a shot.
The result of this very decisive flight was to derange all
calculations entirely. The cavalry was not yet in its place when
the Boer army streamed off between the kopjes. One would have
thought, however, that they would have had a dash for the wagons
and the guns, even if they were past them. It is unfair to
criticise a movement until one is certain as to the positive orders
which the leader may have received; but on the face of it it is
clear that the sweep of our cavalry was not wide enough, and that
they erred by edging to the left instead of to the right, so
leaving the flying enemies always to the outside of them.
