One Of The Outlets, Elands River Poort, Was
Guarded By A Single Squadron Of The 17th Lancers.
Upon this the
Boers made a sudden and very fierce attack, their approach being
facilitated partly by the mist
And partly by the use of khaki, a
trick which seems never to have grown too stale for successful use.
The result was that they were able to ride up to the British camp
before any preparations had been made for resistance, and to shoot
down a number of the Lancers before they could reach their horses.
So terrible was the fire that the single squadron lost thirty-four
killed and thirty-six wounded. But the regiment may console itself
for the disaster by the fact that the sorely stricken detachment
remained true to the spirited motto of the corps, and that no
prisoners appear to have been lost.
After this one sharp engagement there ensued several weeks during
which the absence of historical events, or the presence of the
military censor, caused a singular lull in the account of the
operations. With so many small commandos and so many pursuing
columns it is extraordinary that there should not have been a
constant succession of actions. That there was not must indicate a
sluggishness upon the part of the pursuers, and this sluggishness
can only be explained by the condition of their horses. Every train
of thought brings the critic back always to the great horse
question, and encourages the conclusion that there, at all seasons
of the war and in all scenes of it, is to be found the most damning
indictment against British foresight, common-sense, and power of
organisation. That the third year of the war should dawn without
the British forces having yet got the legs of the Boers, after
having penetrated every portion of their country and having the
horses of the world on which to draw, is the most amazingly
inexplicable point in the whole of this strange campaign. From the
telegram 'Infantry preferred' addressed to a nation of
rough-riders, down to the failure to secure the excellent horses on
the spot, while importing them unfit for use from the ends of the
earth, there has been nothing but one long series of blunders in
this, the most vital question of all. Even up to the end, in the
Colony the obvious lesson had not yet been learnt that it is better
to give 1000 men two horses each, and to let them reach the enemy,
than give 2000 men one horse each, with which they can never attain
their object. The chase during two years of the man with two horses
by the man with one horse, has been a sight painful to ourselves
and ludicrous to others.
In connection with this account of operations within the Colony,
there is one episode which occurred in the extreme north-west which
will not fit in with this connected narrative, but which will
justify the distraction of the reader's intelligence, for few finer
deeds of arms are recorded in the war. This was the heroic defence
of a convoy by the 14th Company of Irish Imperial Yeomanry. The
convoy was taking food to Griquatown, on the Kimberley side of the
seat of war. The town had been long invested by Conroy, and the
inhabitants were in such straits that it was highly necessary to
relieve them. To this end a convoy, two miles long, was despatched
under Major Humby of the Irish Yeomanry. The escort consisted of
seventy-five Northumberland Fusiliers, twenty-four local troops,
and 100 of the 74th Irish Yeomanry. Fifteen miles from Griquatown,
at a place called Rooikopjes, the convoy was attacked by the enemy
several hundred in number. Two companies of the Irishmen seized the
ridge, however, which commanded the wagons, and held it until they
were almost exterminated. The position was covered with bush, and
the two parties came to the closest of quarters, the Yeomen
refusing to take a backward step, though it was clear that they
were vastly outnumbered. Encouraged by the example of Madan and
Ford, their gallant young leaders, they deliberately sacrificed
their lives in order to give time for the guns to come up and for
the convoy to pass. Oliffe, Bonynge, and Maclean, who had been
children together, were shot side by side on the ridge, and
afterwards buried in one grave. Of forty-three men in action,
fourteen were killed and twenty severely wounded. Their sacrifice
was not in vain, however. The Boers were beaten back, and the
convoy, as well as Griquatown, was saved. Some thirty or forty
Boers were killed or wounded in the skirmish, and Conroy, their
leader, declared that it was the stiffest fight of his life.
In the autumn and winter of 1901 General French had steadily
pursued the system of clearing certain districts, one at a time,
and endeavouring by his blockhouses and by the arrangement of his
forces to hold in strict quarantine those sections of the country
which were still infested by the commandos. In this manner he
succeeded by the November of this year in confining the active
forces of the enemy to the extreme north-east and to the south-west
of the peninsula. It is doubtful if the whole Boer force,
three-quarters of whom were colonial rebels, amounted to more than
fifteen hundred men. When we learn that at this period of the war
they were indifferently armed, and that many of them were mounted
upon donkeys, it is impossible, after making every allowance for
the passive assistance of the farmers, and the difficulties of the
country, to believe that the pursuit was always pushed with the
spirit and vigour which was needful.
In the north-east, Myburgh, Wessels, and the truculent Fouche were
allowed almost a free hand for some months, while the roving bands
were rounded up in the midlands and driven along until they were
west of the main railroad. Here, in the Calvinia district, several
commandos united in October 1901 under Maritz, Louw, Smit, and
Theron.
Enter page number
PreviousNext
Page 195 of 222
Words from 197346 to 198361
of 225456
