At Helvetia they attained their object and
even succeeded not merely in destroying, but in removing their
gigantic trophy. At Belfast they would have performed the same feat
had it not been for the foresight of General Smith-Dorrien, who had
the heavy gun trundled back into the town every night.
The attack broke first upon Monument Hill, a post held by Captain
Fosbery with eighty-three Royal Irish. Chance or treason guided the
Boers to the weak point of the wire entanglement and they surged
into the fort, where the garrison fought desperately to hold its
own. There was thick mist and driving rain; and the rush of vague
and shadowy figures amid the gloom was the first warning of the
onslaught. The Irishmen were overborne by a swarm of assailants,
but they nobly upheld their traditional reputation. Fosbery met his
death like a gallant gentleman, but not more heroically than Barry,
the humble private, who, surrounded by Boers, thought neither of
himself nor of them, but smashed at the maxim gun with a pickaxe
until he fell riddled with bullets. Half the garrison were on the
ground before the post was carried.
A second post upon the other side of the town was defended by
Lieutenant Marshall with twenty men, mostly Shropshires. For an
hour they held out until Marshall and nine out of his twelve
Shropshires had been hit. Then this post also was carried.
The Gordon Highlanders held two posts to the southeast and to the
south-west of the town, and these also were vigorously attacked.
Here, however, the advance spent itself without result. In vain the
Ermelo and Carolina commandos stormed up to the Gordon pickets.
They were blown back by the steady fire of the infantry. One small
post manned by twelve Highlanders was taken, but the rest defied
all attack. Seeing therefore that his attempt at a coup-de-main was
a failure, Viljoen withdrew his men before daybreak. The Boer
casualties have not been ascertained, but twenty-four of their dead
were actually picked up within the British lines. The British lost
sixty killed and wounded, while about as many were taken prisoners.
Altogether the action was a brisk and a gallant one, of which
neither side has cause to be ashamed. The simultaneous attacks upon
six other stations were none of them pressed home, and were
demonstrations rather than assaults.
The attempts upon Kaalfontein and on Zuurfontein were both made in
the early morning of January 12th. These two places are small
stations upon the line between Johannesburg and Pretoria. It is
clear that the Boers were very certain of their own superior
mobility before they ventured to intrude into the very heart of the
British position, and the result showed that they were right in
supposing that even if their attempt were repulsed, they would
still be able to make good their escape. Better horsed, better
riders, with better intelligence and a better knowledge of the
country, their ventures were always attended by a limited
liability.
The attacks seem to have been delivered by a strong commando, said
to have been under the command of Beyers, upon its way to join the
Boer concentration in the Eastern Transvaal. They had not the
satisfaction, however, of carrying the garrison of a British post
with them, for at each point they were met by a stout resistance
and beaten off. Kaalfontein was garrisoned by 120 men of Cheshire
under Williams-Freeman, Zuurfontein by as many Norfolks and a small
body of Lincolns under Cordeaux and Atkinson. For six hours the
pressure was considerable, the assailants of Kaalfontein keeping up
a brisk shell and rifle fire, while those of Zuurfontein were
without artillery. At the end of that time two armoured trains came
up with reinforcements and the enemy continued his trek to the
eastward. Knox 's 2nd cavalry brigade followed them up, but without
any very marked result.
Zeerust and Lichtenburg had each been garrisoned and provisioned by
Lord Methuen before he carried his column away to the south-west,
where much rough and useful work awaited him. The two towns were at
once invested by the enemy, who made an attack upon each of them.
That upon Zeerust, on January 7th, was a small matter and easily
repulsed. A more formidable one was made on Lichtenburg, on March
3rd. The attack was delivered by De la Rey, Smuts, and Celliers,
with 1500 men, who galloped up to the pickets in the early morning.
The defenders were 600 in number, consisting of Paget's Horse and
three companies of the 1st battalion of the Northumberland
Fusiliers, a veteran regiment with a long record of foreign
service, not to be confused with that 2nd battalion which was so
severely handled upon several occasions. It was well that it was
so, for less sturdy material might have been overborne by the
vigour of the attack. As it was, the garrison were driven to their
last trench, but held out under a very heavy fire all day, and next
morning the Boers abandoned the attack. Their losses appear to have
been over fifty in number, and included Commandant Celliers, who
was badly wounded and afterwards taken prisoner at Warm Baths. The
brave garrison lost fourteen killed, including two officers of the
Northumberlands, and twenty wounded.
In each of these instances the attacks by the Boers upon British
posts had ended in a repulse to themselves. They were more
fortunate, however, in their attempt upon Modderfontein on the
Gatsrand at the end of January.
