But After The First Move The British
Attitude Became One Of Defence Rather Than Of Attack.
Whatever the
general and ultimate effect of these operations may have been, it
is beyond question that their contemplation was annoying and
bewildering in the extreme to those who were present.
The position
on February 6th was this. Over the river upon the hill was a single
British brigade, exposed to the fire of one enormous gun - a
96-pound Creusot, the longest of all Long Toms - which was stationed
upon Doornkloof, and of several smaller guns and pom-poms which
spat at them from nooks and crevices of the hills. On our side were
seventy-two guns, large and small, all very noisy and impotent. It
is not too much to say, as it appears to me, that the Boers have in
some ways revolutionised our ideas in regard to the use of
artillery, by bringing a fresh and healthy common-sense to bear
upon a subject which had been unduly fettered by pedantic rules.
The Boer system is the single stealthy gun crouching where none can
see it. The British system is the six brave guns coming into action
in line of full interval, and spreading out into accurate dressing
visible to all men. 'Always remember,' says one of our artillery
maxims, 'that one gun is no gun.' Which is prettier on a field-day,
is obvious, but which is business - let the many duels between six
Boer guns and sixty British declare. With black powder it was
useless to hide the gun, as its smoke must betray it. With
smokeless powder the guns are so invisible that it was only by the
detection with powerful glasses of the dust from the trail on the
recoil that the officers were ever able to localise the guns
against which they were fighting. But if the Boers had had six guns
in line, instead of one behind that kopje, and another between
those distant rocks, it would not have been so difficult to say
where they were. Again, British traditions are all in favour of
planting guns close together. At this very action of Vaalkranz the
two largest guns were so placed that a single shell bursting
between them would have disabled them both. The officer who placed
them there, and so disregarded in a vital matter the most obvious
dictates of common-sense, would probably have been shocked by any
want of technical smartness, or irregularity in the routine drill.
An over-elaboration of trifles, and a want of grip of common-sense,
and of adaptation to new ideas, is the most serious and damaging
criticism which can be levelled against our army. That the function
of infantry is to shoot, and not to act like spearmen in the Middle
Ages; that the first duty of artillery is so far as is possible to
be invisible - these are two of the lessons which have been driven
home so often during the war, that even our hidebound conservatism
can hardly resist them.
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