The Force Was Commanded By
A Dashing Soldier, Colonel Dalgety, Of The Cape Mounted Rifles, As
Tough A Fighter As His Famous Namesake.
There were with him nearly
a thousand men of Brabant's Horse, four hundred of the Cape Mounted
Rifles, four hundred Kaffrarian Horse, with some scouts, and one
hundred regulars, including twenty invaluable Sappers.
They were
strong in guns - two seven-pounders, two naval twelve-pounders, two
fifteen-pounders and several machine guns. The position which they
had taken up, Jammersberg, three miles north of Wepener, was a very
strong one, and it would have taken a larger force than De Wet had
at his disposal to turn them out of it. The defence had been
arranged by Major Cedric Maxwell, of the Sappers; and though the
huge perimeter, nearly eight miles, made its defence by so small a
force a most difficult matter, the result proved how good his
dispositions were.
At the same time, the Boers came on with every confidence of
victory, for they had a superiority in guns and an immense
superiority in men. But after a day or two of fierce struggle their
attack dwindled down into a mere blockade. On April 9th they
attacked furiously, both by day and by night, and on the 10th the
pressure was equally severe. In these two days occurred the vast
majority of the casualties. But the defenders took cover in a way
to which British regulars have not yet attained, and they outshot
their opponents both with their rifles and their cannon. Captain
Lukin's management of the artillery was particularly skilful. The
weather was vile and the hastily dug trenches turned into ditches
half full of water, but neither discomfort nor danger shook the
courage of the gallant colonials. Assault after assault was
repulsed, and the scourging of the cannon was met with stolid
endurance. The Boers excelled all their previous feats in the
handling of artillery by dragging two guns up to the summit of the
lofty Jammersberg, whence they fired down upon the camp. Nearly all
the horses were killed and three hundred of the troopers were hit,
a number which is double that of the official return, for the
simple reason that the spirit of the force was so high that only
those who were very severely wounded reported themselves as wounded
at all. None but the serious cases ever reached the hands of Dr.
Faskally, who did admirable work with very slender resources. How
many the enemy lost can never be certainly known, but as they
pushed home several attacks it is impossible to imagine that their
losses were less than those of the victorious defenders. At the end
of seventeen days of mud and blood the brave irregulars saw an
empty laager and abandoned trenches. Their own resistance and the
advance of Brabant to their rescue had caused a hasty retreat of
the enemy. Wepener, Mafeking, Kimberley, the taking of the first
guns at Ladysmith, the deeds of the Imperial Light Horse - it cannot
be denied that our irregular South African forces have a brilliant
record for the war. They are associated with many successes and
with few disasters. Their fine record cannot, I think, be fairly
ascribed to any greater hardihood which one portion of our race has
when compared with another, for a South African must admit that in
the best colonial corps at least half the men were Britons of
Britain. In the Imperial Light Horse the proportion was very much
higher. But what may fairly be argued is that their exploits have
proved, what the American war proved long ago, that the German
conception of discipline is an obsolete fetish, and that the spirit
of free men, whose individualism has been encouraged rather than
crushed, is equal to any feat of arms. The clerks and miners and
engineers who went up Elandslaagte Hill without bayonets, shoulder
to shoulder with the Gordons, and who, according to Sir George
White, saved Ladysmith on January 6th, have shown for ever that
with men of our race it is the spirit within, and not the drill or
the discipline, that makes a formidable soldier. An intelligent
appreciation of the fact might in the course of the next few years
save us as much money as would go far to pay for the war.
It may well be asked how for so long a period as seventeen days the
British could tolerate a force to the rear of them when with their
great superiority of numbers they could have readily sent an army
to drive it away. The answer must be that Lord Roberts had
despatched his trusty lieutenant, Kitchener, to Aliwal, whence he
had been in heliographic communication with Wepener, that he was
sure that the place could hold out, and that he was using it, as he
did Kimberley, to hold the enemy while he was making his plans for
their destruction. This was the bait to tempt them to their ruin.
Had the trap not been a little slow in closing, the war in the Free
State might have ended then and there. From the 9th to the 25th the
Boers were held in front of Wepener. Let us trace the movements of
the other British detachments during that time.
Brabant's force, with Hart's brigade, which had been diverted on
its way to Kimberley, where it was to form part of Hunter's
division, was moving on the south towards Wepener, advancing
through Rouxville, but going slowly for fear of scaring the Boers
away before they were sufficiently compromised. Chermside's 3rd
division approached from the north-west, moving out from the
railway at Bethany, and passing through Reddersberg towards
Dewetsdorp, from which it would directly threaten the Boer line of
retreat. The movement was made with reassuring slowness and
gentleness, as when the curved hand approaches the unconscious fly.
And then suddenly, on April 21st, Lord Roberts let everything go.
Had the action of the agents been as swift and as energetic as the
mind of the planner, De Wet could not have escaped us.
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