The Attack Began At 11 A.M. Of April 3rd, And All Day
The Men Lay Among The Stones, Subjected To The Pelt Of Shell And
Bullet.
The cover was good, however, and the casualties were not
heavy.
The total losses were under fifty killed and wounded. More
serious than the enemy's fire was the absence of water, save a very
limited supply in a cart. A message was passed through of the dire
straits in which they found themselves, and by the late afternoon
the news had reached headquarters. Lord Roberts instantly
despatched the Camerons, just arrived from Egypt, to Bethany, which
is the nearest point upon the line, and telegraphed to Gatacre at
Springfontein to take measures to save his compromised detachment.
The telegram should have reached Gatacre early on the evening of
the 3rd, and he had collected a force of fifteen hundred men,
entrained it, journeyed forty miles up the line, detrained it, and
reached Reddersberg, which is ten or twelve miles from the line, by
10.30 next morning. Already, however, it was too late, and the
besieged force, unable to face a second day without water under
that burning sun, had laid down their arms. No doubt the stress of
thirst was dreadful, and yet one cannot say that the defence rose
to the highest point of resolution. Knowing that help could not be
far off, the garrison should have held on while they could lift a
rifle. If the ammunition was running low, it was bad management
which caused it to be shot away too fast. Captain McWhinnie, who
was in command, behaved with the utmost personal gallantry. Not
only the troops but General Gatacre also was involved in the
disaster. Blame may have attached to him for leaving a detachment
at Dewetsdorp, and not having a supporting body at Reddersberg upon
which it might fall back; but it must be remembered that his total
force was small and that he had to cover a long stretch of the
lines of communication. As to General Gatacre's energy and
gallantry it is a by-word in the army; but coming after the
Stormberg disaster this fresh mishap to his force made the
continuance of his command impossible. Much sympathy was felt with
him in the army, where he was universally liked and respected by
officers and men. He returned to England, and his division was
taken over by General Chermside.
In a single week, at a time when the back of the war had seemed to
be broken, we had lost nearly twelve hundred men with seven guns.
The men of the Free State - for the fighting was mainly done by
commandos from the Ladybrand, Winburg, Bethlehem, and Harrismith
districts - deserve great credit for this fine effort, and their
leader De Wet confirmed the reputation which he had already gained
as a dashing and indefatigable leader. His force was so weak that
when Lord Roberts was able to really direct his own against it, he
brushed it away before him; but the manner in which De Wet took
advantage of Roberts's enforced immobility, and dared to get behind
so mighty an enemy, was a fine exhibition of courage and
enterprise. The public at home chafed at this sudden and unexpected
turn of affairs; but the General, constant to his own fixed
purpose, did not permit his strength to be wasted, and his cavalry
to be again disorganised, by flying excursions, but waited grimly
until he should be strong enough to strike straight at Pretoria.
In this short period of depression there came one gleam of light
from the west. This was the capture of a commando of sixty Boers,
or rather of sixty foreigners fighting for the Boers, and the death
of the gallant Frenchman, De Villebois-Mareuil, who appears to have
had the ambition of playing Lafayette in South Africa to Kruger's
Washington. From the time that Kimberley had been reoccupied the
British had been accumulating their force there so as to make a
strong movement which should coincide with that of Roberts from
Bloemfontein. Hunter's Division from Natal was being moved round to
Kimberley, and Methuen already commanded a considerable body of
troops, which included a number of the newly arrived Imperial
Yeomanry. With these Methuen pacified the surrounding country, and
extended his outposts to Barkly West on the one side, to Boshof on
the other, and to Warrenton upon the Vaal River in the centre. On
April 4th news reached Boshof that a Boer commando had been seen
some ten miles to the east of the town, and a force, consisting of
Yeomanry, Kimberley Light Horse, and half of Butcher's veteran 4th
battery, was sent to attack them. They were found to have taken up
their position upon a kopje which, contrary to all Boer custom, had
no other kopjes to support it. French generalship was certainly not
so astute as Boer cunning. The kopje was instantly surrounded, and
the small force upon the summit being without artillery in the face
of our guns found itself in exactly the same position which our men
had been in twenty-four hours before at Reddersberg. Again was
shown the advantage which the mounted rifleman has over the
cavalry, for the Yeomanry and Light Horsemen left their horses and
ascended the hill with the bayonet. In three hours all was over and
the Boers had laid down their arms. Villebois was shot with seven
of his companions, and there were nearly sixty prisoners. It speaks
well for the skirmishing of the Yeomanry and the way in which they
were handled by Lord Chesham that though they worked their way up
the hill under fire they only lost four killed and a few wounded.
The affair was a small one, but it was complete, and it came at a
time when a success was very welcome. One bustling week had seen
the expensive victory of Karee, the disasters of Sanna's Post and
Reddersberg, and the successful skirmish of Boshof.
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