Roberts's Horse, The New Zealanders, And
The Mounted Infantry Were The Other Corps Which Suffered Most
Heavily.
Among many brave men who died, none was a greater loss to
the service than Major Booth of the Northumberland Fusiliers,
serving in the mounted infantry.
With four comrades he held a
position to cover the retreat, and refused to leave it. Such men
are inspired by the traditions of the past, and pass on the story
of their own deaths to inspire fresh heroes in the future.
Broadwood, the instant that he had disentangled himself, faced
about, and brought his guns into action. He was not strong enough,
however, nor were his men in a condition, to seriously attack the
enemy. Martyr's mounted infantry had come up, led by the
Queenslanders, and at the cost of some loss to themselves helped to
extricate the disordered force. Colvile's Division was behind
Bushman's Kop, only a few miles off, and there were hopes that it
might push on and prevent the guns and wagons from being removed.
Colvile did make an advance, but slowly and in a flanking direction
instead of dashing swiftly forward to retrieve the situation. It
must be acknowledged, however, that the problem which faced this
General was one of great difficulty. It was almost certain that
before he could throw his men into the action the captured guns
would be beyond his reach, and it was possible that he might swell
the disaster. With all charity, however, one cannot but feel that
his return next morning, after a reinforcement during the night,
without any attempt to force the Boer position, was lacking in
enterprise. [Footnote: It may be urged in General Colvile's defence
that his division had already done a long march from Bloemfontein.
A division, however, which contains two such brigades as
Macdonald's and Smith-Dorrien's may safely be called upon for any
exertions. The gunner officers in Colvile's division heard their
comrades' guns in 'section - fire' and knew it to be the sign of a
desperate situation.] The victory left the Boers in possession of
the waterworks, and Bloemfontein had to fall back upon her wells - a
change which reacted most disastrously upon the enteric which was
already decimating the troops.
The effect of the Sanna's Post defeat was increased by the fact
that only four days later (on April 4th) a second even more
deplorable disaster befell our troops. This was the surrender of
five companies of infantry, two of them mounted, at Reddersberg. So
many surrenders of small bodies of troops had occurred during the
course of the war that the public, remembering how seldom the word
'surrender' had ever been heard in our endless succession of
European wars, had become very restive upon the subject, and were
sometimes inclined to question whether this new and humiliating
fact did not imply some deterioration of our spirit. The fear was
natural, and yet nothing could be more unjust to this the most
splendid army which has ever marched under the red-crossed flag.
The fact was new because the conditions were new, and it was
inherent in those conditions. In that country of huge distances
small bodies must be detached, for the amount of space covered by
the large bodies was not sufficient for all military purposes. In
reconnoitring, in distributing proclamations, in collecting arms,
in overawing outlying districts, weak columns must be used. Very
often these columns must contain infantry soldiers, as the demands
upon the cavalry were excessive. Such bodies, moving through a
hilly country with which they were unfamiliar, were always liable
to be surrounded by a mobile enemy. Once surrounded the length of
their resistance was limited by three things: their cartridges,
their water, and their food. When they had all three, as at Wepener
or Mafeking, they could hold out indefinitely. When one or other
was wanting, as at Reddersberg or Nicholson's Nek, their position
was impossible. They could not break away, for how can men on foot
break away from horsemen? Hence those repeated humiliations, which
did little or nothing to impede the course of the war, and which
were really to be accepted as one of the inevitable prices which we
had to pay for the conditions under which the war was fought.
Numbers, discipline, and resources were with us. Mobility,
distances, nature of the country, insecurity of supplies, were with
them. We need not take it to heart therefore if it happened, with
all these forces acting against them, that our soldiers found
themselves sometimes in a position whence neither wisdom nor valour
could rescue them. To travel through that country, fashioned above
all others for defensive warfare, with trench and fort of
superhuman size and strength, barring every path, one marvels how
it was that such incidents were not more frequent and more serious.
It is deplorable that the white flag should ever have waved over a
company of British troops, but the man who is censorious upon the
subject has never travelled in South Africa.
In the disaster at Reddersberg three of the companies were of the
Irish Rifles, and two of the 2nd Northumberland Fusiliers - the same
unfortunate regiments which had already been cut up at Stormberg.
They had been detached from Gatacre's 3rd Division, the
headquarters of which was at Springfontein. On the abandonment of
Thabanchu and the disaster of Sanna's Post, it was obvious that we
should draw in our detached parties to the east; so the five
companies were ordered to leave Dewetsdorp, which they were
garrisoning, and to get back to the railway line. Either the order
was issued too late, or they were too slow in obeying it, for they
were only halfway upon their journey, near the town of Reddersberg,
when the enemy came down upon them with five guns. Without
artillery they were powerless, but, having seized a kopje, they
took such shelter as they could find, and waited in the hope of
succour. Their assailants seem to have been detached from De Wet's
force in the north, and contained among them many of the victors of
Sanna's Post.
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