Colonel Pilcher, The Leader Of The Douglas Raid, Was Inclined To
Explore A Little Further, And With Three Squadrons Of Mounted Men
He Rode On To The Eastward.
Two commandos, supposed to be Grobler's
and Olivier's, were seen by them, moving on a line which suggested
that they were going to join Steyn, who was known to be rallying
his forces at Kroonstad, his new seat of government in the north of
the Free State.
Pilcher, with great daring, pushed onwards until
with his little band on their tired horses he found himself in
Ladybrand, thirty miles from his nearest supports. Entering the
town he seized the landdrost and the field-cornet, but found that
strong bodies of the enemy were moving upon him and that it was
impossible for him to hold the place. He retired, therefore,
holding grimly on to his prisoners, and got back with small loss to
the place from which he started. It was a dashing piece of bluff,
and, when taken with the Douglas exploit, leads one to hope that
Pilcher may have a chance of showing what he can do with larger
means at his disposal. Finding that the enemy was following him in
force, he pushed on the same night for Thabanchu. His horsemen must
have covered between fifty and sixty miles in the twenty-four
hours.
Apparently the effect of Pilcher's exploit was to halt the march of
those commandos which had been seen trekking to the north-west, and
to cause them to swing round upon Thabanchu. Broadwood, a young
cavalry commander who had won a name in Egypt, considered that his
position was unnecessarily exposed and fell back upon Bloemfontein.
He halted on the first night near the waterworks, halfway upon his
journey.
The Boers are great masters in the ambuscade. Never has any race
shown such aptitude for this form of warfare - a legacy from a long
succession of contests with cunning savages. But never also have
they done anything so clever and so audacious as De Wet's
dispositions in this action. One cannot go over the ground without
being amazed at the ingenuity of their attack, and also at the luck
which favoured them, for the trap which they had laid for others
might easily have proved an absolutely fatal one for themselves.
The position beside the Modder at which the British camped had
numerous broken hills to the north and east of it. A force of
Boers, supposed to number about two thousand men, came down in the
night, bringing with them several heavy guns, and with the early
morning opened a brisk fire upon the camp. The surprise was
complete. But the refinement of the Boer tactics lay in the fact
that they had a surprise within a surprise - and it was the second
which was the more deadly.
The force which Broadwood had with him consisted of the 10th
Hussars and the composite regiment, Rimington's Scouts, Roberts's
Horse, the New Zealand and Burmah Mounted Infantry, with Q and U
batteries of Horse Artillery. With such a force, consisting
entirely of mounted men, he could not storm the hills upon which
the Boer guns were placed, and his twelve-pounders were unable to
reach the heavier cannon of the enemy. His best game was obviously
to continue his march to Bloemfontein. He sent on the considerable
convoy of wagons and the guns, while he with the cavalry covered
the rear, upon which the long-range pieces of the enemy kept up the
usual well-directed but harmless fire.
Broadwood's retreating column now found itself on a huge plain
which stretches all the way to Bloemfontein, broken only by two
hills, both of which were known to be in our possession. The plain
was one which was continually traversed from end to end by our
troops and convoys, so that once out upon its surface all danger
seemed at an end. Broadwood had additional reasons for feeling
secure, for he knew that, in answer to his own wise request,
Colvile's Division had been sent out before daybreak that morning
from Bloemfontein to meet him. In a very few miles their vanguard
and his must come together. There were obviously no Boers upon the
plain, but if there were they would find themselves between two
fires. He gave no thought to his front therefore, but rode behind,
where the Boer guns were roaring, and whence the Boer riflemen
might ride.
But in spite of the obvious there WERE Boers upon the plain, so
placed that they must either bring off a remarkable surprise or be
themselves cut off to a man. Across the veld, some miles from the
waterworks, there runs a deep donga or watercourse - one of many,
but the largest. It cuts the rough road at right angles. Its depth
and breadth are such that a wagon would dip down the incline, and
disappear for about two minutes before it would become visible
again at the crown of the other side. In appearance it was a huge
curving ditch with a stagnant stream at the bottom. The sloping
sides of the ditch were fringed with Boers, who had ridden thither
before dawn and were now waiting for the unsuspecting column. There
were not more than three hundred of them, and four times their
number were approaching; but no odds can represent the difference
between the concealed man with the magazine rifle and the man upon
the plain.
There were two dangers, however, which the Boers ran, and, skilful
as their dispositions were, their luck was equally great, for the
risks were enormous. One was that a force coming the other way
(Colvile's was only a few miles off) would arrive, and that they
would be ground between the upper and the lower millstone. The
other was that for once the British scouts might give the alarm and
that Broadwood's mounted men would wheel swiftly to right and left
and secure the ends of the long donga.
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