Kelly-Kenny's Division (6th) had
orders to follow and support this movement. Meanwhile Tucker was to
push straight along the southern bank of the river, though we may
surmise that his instructions were, in case of resistance, not to
push his attack home. Colvile's 9th Division, with part of the
naval brigade, were north of the river, the latter to shell the
drifts in case the Boers tried to cross, and the infantry to
execute a turning movement which would correspond with that of the
cavalry on the other flank.
The plan of action was based, however, upon one supposition which
proved to be fallacious. It was that after having prepared so
elaborate a position the enemy would stop at least a little time to
defend it. Nothing of the sort occurred, however, and on the
instant that they realised that the cavalry was on their flank they
made off. The infantry did not fire a shot.
The result of this very decisive flight was to derange all
calculations entirely. The cavalry was not yet in its place when
the Boer army streamed off between the kopjes. One would have
thought, however, that they would have had a dash for the wagons
and the guns, even if they were past them. It is unfair to
criticise a movement until one is certain as to the positive orders
which the leader may have received; but on the face of it it is
clear that the sweep of our cavalry was not wide enough, and that
they erred by edging to the left instead of to the right, so
leaving the flying enemies always to the outside of them.
As it was, however, there seemed every possibility of their getting
the guns, but De Wet very cleverly covered them by his skirmishers.
Taking possession of a farmhouse on the right flank they kept up a
spirited fire upon the 16th Lancers and upon P battery R.H.A. When
at last the latter drove them out of their shelter, they again
formed upon a low kopje and poured so galling a fire upon the right
wing that the whole movement was interrupted until we had driven
this little body of fifty men from their position. When, after a
delay of an hour, the cavalry at last succeeded in dislodging
them - or possibly it may be fairer to say when, having accomplished
their purpose, they retired - the guns and wagons were out of reach,
and, what is more important, the two Presidents, both Steyn and
Kruger, who had come to stiffen the resistance of the burghers, had
escaped.
Making every allowance for the weary state of the horses, it is
impossible to say that our cavalry were handled with energy or
judgment on this occasion. That such a force of men and guns should
be held off from an object of such importance by so small a
resistance reflects no credit upon us. It would have been better to
repeat the Kimberley tactics and to sweep the regiments in extended
order past the obstacle if we could not pass over it. At the other
side of that little ill-defended kopje lay a possible termination
of the war, and our crack cavalry regiments manoeuvred for hours
and let it pass out of their reach. However, as Lord Roberts
good-humouredly remarked at the end of the action, 'In war you
can't expect everything to come out right.' General French can
afford to shed one leaf from his laurel wreath. On the other hand,
no words can be too high for the gallant little band of Boers who
had the courage to face that overwhelming mass of horsemen, and to
bluff them into regarding this handful as a force fighting a
serious rearguard action. When the stories of the war are told
round the fires in the lonely veld farmhouses, as they will be for
a century to come, this one deserves an honoured place.
The victory, if such a word can apply to such an action, had cost
some fifty or sixty of the cavalry killed and wounded, while it is
doubtful if the Boers lost as many. The finest military display on
the British side had been the magnificent marching of Kelly-Kenny's
6th Division, who had gone for ten hours with hardly a halt. One
9-pound Krupp gun was the only trophy. On the other hand, Roberts
had turned them out of their strong position, had gained twelve or
fifteen miles on he road to Bloemfontein, and for the first time
shown how helpless a Boer army was in country which gave our
numbers a chance. From now onwards it was only in surprise and
ambuscade that they could hope for a success. We had learned and
they had learned that they could not stand in the open field.
The action of Poplars Grove was fought on March 7th. On the 9th the
army was again on its way, and on the 10th it attacked the new
position which the Boers had occupied at a place called
Driefontein, or Abram's Kraal. They covered a front of some seven
miles in such a formation that their wings were protected, the
northern by the river and the southern by flanking bastions of hill
extending for some distance to the rear. If the position had been
defended as well as it had been chosen, the task would have been a
severe one.
Since the Modder covered the enemy's right the turning movement
could only be developed on their left, and Tucker's Division was
thrown out very wide on that side for the purpose. But in the
meanwhile a contretemps had occurred which threw out and seriously
hampered the whole British line of battle.
