Tools Were
Brought, A Plate Was Removed, And There Emerged, Safe And Sound From The
Hold In Which They Had Been Thus Terribly Imprisoned, The Second Engineer
And A Stoker.
When the rapidity with which the steamer turned upside down,
with the engines working, the fires burning, and the
Boilers full -
the darkness, with all the floors become ceilings - the violent inrush
of water - the wild career down the stream - are remembered, it will be
conceded that the experience of these men was sufficiently remarkable.
Search was now made for another passage. This was found on the 6th,
nearer the right bank of the river. On the 8th the Metemma arrived with 300
more men of the 7th Egyptians. Three days were spent in preparations and to
allow the Nile to rise a little more. On the 13th, elaborate precautions
being observed, the Metemma passed the cataract safely, and was tied up to
the bank on the higher reach. The Tamai followed the next day. On the 19th
and 20th the new gunboats Fateh, Naser, and Zafir, the most powerful
vessels on the river, accomplished the passage. Meanwhile the Metemma and
Tamai had already proceeded up stream. On the 23rd the unarmed steamer Dal
made the ascent, and by the 29th the whole flotilla reached
Abu Hamed safely.
After the arrival of the gunboats events began to move at the double.
The sudden dart upon Abu Hamed had caused the utmost consternation among
the Dervishes. Finding that Mahmud was not going to reinforce him, and
fearing the treachery of the local tribes, Zeki Osman, the Emir in Berber,
decided to fall back, and on the 24th he evacuated Berber and marched
south. On the 27th General Hunter at Abu Hamed heard that the Dervish
garrison had left the town. The next day he despatched Abdel-Azim,
the chief of Irregulars, and Ahmed Bey Khalifa, his brother, with forty
Ababda tribesmen, to reconnoitre. These bold fellows pushed on recklessly,
and found the inhabitants everywhere terrified or acquiescent. Spreading
extraordinary tales of the strength of the army who were following them,
they created a panic all along the river, and, in spite of a sharp fight
with a Dervish patrol, reached Berber on the 31st. As there was no armed
force in the town, the enterprising allies rode into the streets and
occupied the grain store - the only public building - in the name of the
Government. They then sent word back to Abu Hamed of what they had done,
and sat down in the town, thus audaciously captured, to await developments.
The astonishing news of the fall of Berber reached General Hunter
on the 2nd of September. He immediately telegraphed to Merawi. Sir Herbert
Kitchener was confronted with a momentous question: should Berber be
occupied or not? It may at first seem that there could be little doubt
about the matter. The objective of the expedition was Omdurman.
The occupation of Berber by an Egyptian garrison would settle at once the
difficulties near Suakin. The town was believed to be on the clear waterway
to the Dervish capital. The moral effect of its capture upon the riverain
tribes and throughout the Soudan would be enormous. Berber was, in fact,
the most important strategic point on the whole line of advance. This great
prize and advantage was now to be had for the asking.
The opposite considerations were, however, tremendous. Abu Hamed marked
a definite stage in the advance. As long as Merawi and the other posts in
Dongola were strongly held, the line from Abu Hamed to Debba was capable of
easy defence. Abu Hamed could soon be made impregnable to Dervish attack.
The forces in Dongola could be quickly concentrated on any threatened
point. At this moment in the campaign it was possible to stop and wait with
perfect safety. In the meantime the Khalifa would steadily weaken and the
railway might steadily grow. When the line reached the angle of the river,
it would be time to continue the systematic and cautious advance.
Until then prudence and reason counselled delay. To occupy Berber was to
risk much. Mahmud, with a large and victorious army, lay at Metemma.
Osman Digna, with 2,000 men, held Adarama almost within striking distance.
The railway still lagged in the desert. The Dongola garrisons must be
weakened to provide a force for Berber. The Dervishes had the advantage of
occupying the interior of the angle which the Nile forms at Abu Hamed.
The troops in Berber would have to draw their supplies by a long and
slender line of camel communication, winding along all the way from Merawi,
and exposed, as a glance at the map will show, throughout its whole length
to attack. More than all this: to advance to Berber must inevitably force
the development of the whole war. The force in the town would certainly
have its communications threatened, would probably have to fight for its
very existence. The occupation of Berber would involve sooner or later a
general action; not a fight like Firket, Hafir, or Abu Hamed, with the
advantage of numbers on the side of the Egyptian troops, but an even
battle. For such a struggle British troops were necessary. At this time
it seemed most unlikely that they would be granted. But if Berber was
occupied, the war, until the arrival of British troops, would cease to be
so largely a matter of calculation, and must pass almost entirely into the
sphere of chance. The whole situation was premature and unforeseen.
The Sirdar had already won success. To halt was to halt in safety; to go on
was to go on at hazard. Most of the officers who had served long in the
Egyptian army understood the question. They waited the decision
in suspense.
The Sirdar and the Consul-General unhesitatingly faced the responsibility
together. On the 3rd of September General Hunter received orders to occupy
Berber. He started at once with 350 men of the IXth Soudanese on board
the gunboats Tamai, Zafir, Naser, and Fateh.
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