In The Abu Hamed Phase The Supplies Were So Regulated That A
Convoy Travelling From Murat Wells Along The Caravan Route Arrived The Day
After The Fight; And Thereafter Communications Were Opened With Merawi.
The Unexpected Occupation Of Berber, Following Abu Hamed, Created The Most
Difficult Situation Of The War.
Until the railway was forced on to Berber
a peculiarly inconvenient line of supply had to be used; and strings
of camels, scattering never less than 30 per cent of their loads,
meandered through the rough and thorny country between Merawi and
Abu Hamed.
This line was strengthened by other convoys from Murat and
the approaching Railhead, and a system of boats and camel portages
filtered the supplies to their destination.
Even when the railway had reached Dakhesh the tension was only slightly
relaxed. The necessity of supplying the large force at Berber, 108 miles
from Railhead, still required the maintenance of a huge and complicated
system of boat and camel transport. Of course, as the railway advanced,
it absorbed stage after stage of river and portage, and the difficulties
decreased. But the reader may gain some idea of their magnitude by
following the progress of a box of biscuits from Cairo to Berber in the
month of December 1897. The route was as follows: From Cairo to Nagh
Hamadi (340 miles) by rail; from Nagh Hamadi to Assuan (205 miles)
by boat; from Assuan to Shellal (6 miles} by rail; from Shellal to Halfa
(226 miles) by boat; from Halfa to Dakhesh (Railhead) - 248 miles -
by military railway; from Dakhesh to Shereik (45 miles) by boat; from
Shereik by camel (13 miles) round a cataract to Bashtinab; from Bashtinab
by boat (25 miles) to Omsheyo; from Omsheyo round another impracticable
reach (11 miles) by camel to Geneinetti, and thence (22 miles) to Berber
by boat. The road taken by this box of biscuits was followed by every ton
of supplies required by 10,000 men in the field. The uninterrupted working
of the long and varied chain was vital to the welfare of the army and the
success of the war. It could only be maintained if every section was
adequately supplied and none were either choked or starved. This problem
had to be solved correctly every day by the transport officers, in spite
of uncertain winds that retarded the boats, of camels that grew sick or
died, and of engines that repeatedly broke down. In the face of every
difficulty a regular supply was maintained. The construction of the railway
was not delayed, nor the food of the troops reduced.
The line continued to grow rapidly, and as it grew the difficulties of
supply decreased. The weight was shifted from the backs of the camels and
the bottoms of the sailing-boats to the trucks of the iron road. The strong
hands of steam were directed to the prosecution of the war, and the
swiftness of the train replaced the toilsome plodding of the caravan.
The advance of the Dervishes towards Berber checked the progress of the
railway. Military precautions were imperative. Construction was delayed by
the passage of the 1st British Brigade from Cairo to the front, and by the
consequently increased volume of daily supplies. By the 10th of March,
however, the line was completed to Bashtinab. On the 5th of May it had
reached Abadia. On the 3rd of July the whole railway from Wady Halfa
to the Atbara was finished, and the southern terminus was established in
the great entrenched camp at the confluence of the rivers. The question
of supply was then settled once and for all. In less than a week stores
sufficient for three months were poured along the line, and the exhausting
labours of the commissariat officers ended. Their relief and achievement
were merged in the greater triumph of the Railway Staff. The director and
his subalterns had laboured long, and their efforts were crowned with
complete success. On the day that the first troop train steamed into the
fortified camp at the confluence of the Nile and the Atbara rivers the doom
of the Dervishes was sealed. It had now become possible with convenience
and speed to send into the heart of the Soudan great armies independent of
the season of the year and of the resources of the country; to supply them
not only with abundant food and ammunition, but with all the varied
paraphernalia of scientific war; and to support their action on land by a
powerful flotilla of gunboats, which could dominate the river and command
the banks, and could at any moment make their way past Khartoum even to
Sennar, Fashoda, or Sobat. Though the battle was not yet fought,
the victory was won. The Khalifa, his capital, and his army were now within
the Sirdar's reach. It remained only to pluck the fruit in the most
convenient hour, with the least trouble and at the smallest cost.
CHAPTER IX: ABU HAMED
The last chapter carried the account of the war forward at express speed.
The reader, who had already on the railway reached the Atbara encampment
and was prepared for the final advance on Khartoum, must allow his mind to
revert to a period when the Egyptian forces are distributed along the river
in garrisons at Dongola, Debba, Korti, and Merawi; when the reorganisation
of the conquered province has been begun; and when the Desert Railway is
still stretching steadily forward towards Abu Hamed.
The news of the fall of Dongola created a panic in Omdurman.
Great numbers of Arabs, believing that the Khalifa's power was about to
collapse, fled from the city. All business was at a standstill. For several
days there were no executions. Abdullah himself kept his house, and thus
doubtfully concealed his vexation and alarm from his subjects. On the fifth
day, however, having recovered his own confidence, he proceeded to the
mosque, and after the morning prayer ascended his small wooden pulpit and
addressed the assembled worshippers. After admitting the retreat of the
Dervishes under Wad Bishara, he enlarged on the losses the 'Turks' had
sustained and described their miserable condition.
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