Difficult for small raiding
parties to cut the line or attack the construction gangs; and before the
line got within reach of the Dervish garrison at Abu Hamed, that garrison
would be dislodged and the place seized.
The plan was perfect, and the argument in its favour conclusive.
It turned, however, on one point: Was the Desert Railway a possibility?
With this question the General was now confronted. He appealed to expert
opinion. Eminent railway engineers in England were consulted. They replied
with unanimity that, having due regard to the circumstances, and
remembering the conditions of war under which the work must be executed,
it was impossible to construct such a line. Distinguished soldiers were
approached on the subject. They replied that the scheme was not only
impossible, but absurd. Many other persons who were not consulted
volunteered the opinion that the whole idea was that of a lunatic,
and predicted ruin and disaster to the expedition. Having received this
advice, and reflected on it duly, the Sirdar ordered the railway to be
constructed without more delay.
A further question immediately arose: Should the railway to Abu Hamed
start from Korosko or from Wady Halfa? There were arguments on both sides.
The adoption of the Korosko line would reduce the river stage from Assuan
by forty-eight hours up stream. The old caravan route, by which General
Gordon had travelled to Khartoum on his last journey, had been from Korosko
via Murat Wells to Abu Hamed. On the other hand, many workshops and
appliances for construction were already existing at Wady Halfa. It was the
northern terminus of the Dongola railway. This was an enormous advantage.
Both routes were reconnoitred: that from Wady Halfa was selected.
The decision having been taken, the enterprise was at once begun.
Lieutenant Girouard, to whom everything was entrusted, was told to make
the necessary estimates. Sitting in his hut at Wady Halfa, he drew up a
comprehensive list. Nothing was forgotten. Every want was provided for;
every difficulty was foreseen; every requisite was noted. The questions
to be decided were numerous and involved. How much carrying capacity was
required? How much rolling stock? How many engines? What spare parts?
How much oil? How many lathes? How many cutters? How many punching and
shearing machines? What arrangements of signals would be necessary?
How many lamps? How many points? How many trolleys? What amount of coal
should be ordered? How much water would be wanted? How should it be
carried? To what extent would its carriage affect the hauling power and
influence all previous calculations? How much railway plant was needed?
How many miles of rail? How many thousand sleepers? Where could they be
procured at such short notice? How many fishplates were necessary?
What tools would be required? What appliances? What machinery? How much
skilled labour was wanted? How much of the class of labour available?
How were the workmen to be fed and watered? How much food would they want?
How many trains a day must be run to feed them and their escort? How many
must be run to carry plant? How did these requirements affect the estimate
for rolling stock? The answers to all these questions, and to many others
with which I will not inflict the reader, were set forth by Lieutenant
Girouard in a ponderous volume several inches thick; and such was the
comprehensive accuracy of the estimate that the working parties were
never delayed by the want even of a piece of brass wire.
In any circumstances the task would have been enormous. It was, however,
complicated by five important considerations: It had to be executed with
military precautions. There was apparently no water along the line.
The feeding of 2,000 platelayers in a barren desert was a problem in
itself. The work had to be completed before the winter. And, finally,
the money voted was not to be outrun. The Sirdar attended to
the last condition.
Girouard was sent to England to buy the plant and rolling stock.
Fifteen new engines and two hundred trucks were ordered. The necessary new
workshops were commenced at Halfa. Experienced mechanics were procured to
direct them. Fifteen hundred additional men were enlisted in the Railway
Battalion and trained. Then the water question was dealt with.
The reconnoitring surveys had reported that though the line was certainly
'good and easy' for 110 miles - and, according to Arab accounts, for the
remaining 120 miles - no drop of water was to be found, and only two likely
spots for wells were noted. Camel transport was, of course, out of the
question. Each engine must first of all haul enough water to carry it to
Railhead and back, besides a reserve against accidents. It was evident that
the quantity of water required by any locomotive would continually increase
as the work progressed and the distance grew greater, until finally the
material trains would have one-third of their carrying power absorbed in
transporting the water for their own consumption. The amount of water
necessary is largely dependent on the grades of the line. The 'flat desert'
proved to be a steady slope up to a height of 1,600 feet above Halfa,
and the calculations were further complicated. The difficulty had,
however, to be faced, and a hundred 1,500-gallon tanks were procured.
These were mounted on trucks and connected by hose; and the most striking
characteristic of the trains of the Soudan military railway was the long
succession of enormous boxes on wheels, on which the motive power of the
engine and the lives of the passengers depended.
The first spadeful of sand of the Desert Railway was turned
on the first day of 1897; but until May, when the line to Kerma was
finished, no great efforts were made, and only forty miles of track had
been laid.
