The Dervish Infantry Made
Their Way Along The River To Abu Hamed, And Were Much Harassed By The
Gunboats Until They Reached The Fourth Cataract, When The Pursuit
Was Brought To An End.
The Egyptian losses in the capture of Dongola and in the subsequent pursuit
were:
The occupation of Dongola terminated the campaign of 1896.
About 900 prisoners, mostly the Black Jehadia, all the six brass cannon,
large stores of grain, and a great quantity of flags, spears, and swords
fell to the victors, and the whole of the province, said to be the most
fertile in the Soudan, was restored to the Egyptian authority.
The existence of a perpetual clear waterway from the head of the Third
Cataract to Merawi enabled the gunboats at once to steam up the river
for more than 200 miles, and in the course of the following month the
greater part of the army was established in Merawi below the Fourth
Cataract, at Debba, or at Korti, drawing supplies along the railway,
and from Railhead by a boat service on the long reach of open water.
The position of a strong force at Merawi - only 120 miles along the river
bank from Abu Hamed, the northern Dervish post - was, as will be seen,
convenient to the continuance of the campaign whenever the time should
arrive. But a long delay in the advance was now inevitable, and nearly
a year was destined to pass without any collision between the forces
of the Khedive and those of the Khalifa.
The success of the operations caused great public satisfaction in England.
The first step had been taken. The Soudan was re-entered. After ten years
of defensive war the Dervishes had been attacked, and it was clear that
when they were attacked with adequate forces they were not so very terrible
after all. The croakers were silent. A general desire was manifested in the
country that the operations should continue, and although the Government
did not yet abandon their tentative policy, or resolve utterly to destroy
the Khalifa's power, it was decided that, as the road had so far been safe
and pleasant, there was at present no need to stop or turn back.
A generous gazette of honours was published. With a single exception,
which it would be invidious to specify, all the officers of the Egyptian
army were mentioned in despatches. Sir H. Kitchener, Colonel Hunter,
and Colonel Rundle were promoted Major-Generals for distinguished service
in the field; a special medal - on whose ribbon the Blue Nile is shown
flowing through the yellow desert - was struck; and both the engagement at
Firket and the affair at Hafir were commemorated by clasps. The casualties
during the campaign, including the fighting round Suakin, were 43 killed
and 139 wounded; 130 officers and men died from cholera; and there were
126 deaths from other causes. A large number of British officers
were also invalided.
CHAPTER VIII: THE DESERT RAILWAY
It often happens that in prosperous public enterprises the applause
of the nation and the rewards of the sovereign are bestowed on those whose
offices are splendid and whose duties have been dramatic. Others whose
labours were no less difficult, responsible, and vital to success are
unnoticed. If this be true of men, it is also true of things. In a tale of
war the reader's mind is filled with the fighting. The battle - with its
vivid scenes, its moving incidents, its plain and tremendous results -
excites imagination and commands attention. The eye is fixed on the
fighting brigades as they move amid the smoke; on the swarming figures of
the enemy; on the General, serene and determined, mounted in the middle of
his Staff. The long trailing line of communications is unnoticed.
The fierce glory that plays on red, triumphant bayonets dazzles the
observer; nor does he care to look behind to where, along a thousand miles
of rail, road, and river, the convoys are crawling to the front in
uninterrupted succession. Victory is the beautiful, bright-coloured flower.
Transport is the stem without which it could never have blossomed.
Yet even the military student, in his zeal to master the fascinating
combinations of the actual conflict, often forgets the far more intricate
complications of supply.
It cannot be denied that a battle, the climax to which all military
operations tend, is an event which is not controlled by strategy or
organisation. The scheme may be well planned, the troops well fed, the
ammunition plentiful, and the enemy entangled, famished, or numerically
inferior. The glorious uncertainties of the field can yet reverse
everything. The human element - in defiance of experience and probability -
may produce a wholly irrational result, and a starving, out-manoeuvred army
win food, safety, and honour by their bravery. But such considerations
apply with greater force to wars where both sides are equal in equipment
and discipline. In savage warfare in a flat country the power of modern
machinery is such that flesh and blood can scarcely prevail, and the
chances of battle are reduced to a minimum. Fighting the Dervishes was
primarily a matter of transport. The Khalifa was conquered on the railway.
Hitherto, as the operations have progressed, it has been convenient
to speak of the railway in a general manner as having been laid or
extended to various points, and merely to indicate the direction of the
lines of communication. The reader is now invited to take a closer view.
This chapter is concerned with boats, railways, and pack animals,
but particularly with railways.
Throughout the Dongola campaign in 1896 the Nile was the main channel
of communication between the Expeditionary Force and its base in Egypt.
All supplies were brought to the front as far as possible by water
transport. Wherever the Nile was navigable, it was used. Other means of
conveyance - by railways and pack animals - though essential, were merely
supplementary. Boats carry more and cost less than any other form of
transport.
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