Wady Halfa was also deserted, and, except for the
British battalion in garrison, could scarcely boast a soldier. Both the
Egyptian battalions from Suakin had arrived on the Nile. The Xth Soudanese
were on their way. The country beyond Akasha had been thoroughly
reconnoitred and mapped to within three miles of the Dervish position.
Everything was ready.
The actual concentration may be said to have begun on the 1st of June,
when the Sirdar started for the front from Halfa, whither he had returned
after the cavalry skirmish. Construction work on the railway came to a
full stop. The railway battalions, dropping their picks and shovels,
shouldered their Remington rifles and became the garrisons of the posts
on the line of communications. On the 2nd of June the correspondents
were permitted to proceed to Akasha. On the 3rd the Xth Soudanese passed
through Ambigole and marched south. The Horse battery from Halfa followed.
The Egyptian battalions and squadrons which had been camped along the river
at convenient spots from Ambigole to Akasha marched to a point opposite
Okma. Between this place and the advanced post an extensive camp,
stretching three miles along the Nile bank, arose with magic swiftness.
On the 4th the 7th Egyptians moved from Railhead, and with these the last
battalion reached the front. Nine thousand men, with ample supplies, were
collected within striking distance of the enemy.
All this time the Dervishes at Firket watched in senseless apathy
the deliberate, machine-like preparations for their destruction.
They should have had good information, for although the Egyptian cavalry
patrolled ceaselessly, and the outpost line was impassable to scouts, their
spies, as camel-drivers, water-carriers, and the like, were in the camp.
They may not, perhaps, have known the exact moment of the intended blow,
for the utmost secrecy was observed. But though they must have realised
that it was imminent, they did nothing. There was, indeed, no course open
to them but retreat. Once the army was concentrated with sufficient
supplies at Akasha, their position was utterly untenable.
The Emir-in-Chief, Hammuda, then had scarcely 3,000 men around his flag.
Their rifles and ammunition were bad; their supplies scanty. Nor could the
valour of fifty-seven notable Emirs sustain the odds against them.
There was still time to fall back on Kosheh, or even on Suarda - anywhere
outside the sweep of their terrible enemy's sword. They would not budge.
Obstinate and fatuous to the last, they dallied and paltered on the fatal
ground, until sudden, blinding, inevitable catastrophe fell upon them from
all sides at once, and swept them out of existence as a military force.
CHAPTER VI: FIRKET
June 7, 1896
Since the end of 1895 the Dervish force in Firket had been
under the command of the Emir Hammuda, and it was through the indolence
and neglect of this dissipated Arab that the Egyptian army had been able
to make good its position at Akasha without any fighting. Week after week
the convoys had straggled unmolested through the difficult country between
Sarras and the advanced base. No attack had been made upon the brigade at
Akasha. No enterprise was directed against its communications. This fatal
inactivity did not pass unnoticed by Wad Bishara, the Governor of Dongola;
but although he was nominally in supreme command of all the Dervish forces
in the province he had hardly any means of enforcing his authority.
His rebukes and exhortations, however, gradually roused Hammuda, and during
May two or three minor raids were planned and executed, and the Egyptian
position at Akasha was several times reconnoitred.
Bishara remained unsatisfied, and at length, despairing of infusing energy
into Hammuda, he ordered his subordinate Osman Azrak to supersede him.
Osman was a Dervish of very different type. He was a fanatical and devoted
believer in the Mahdi and a loyal follower of the Khalifa. For many years
he had served on the northern frontier of the Dervish Empire, and his name
was well known to the Egyptian Government as the contriver of the most
daring and the most brutal raids. His cruelty to the wretched inhabitants
of the border villages had excluded him from all hope of mercy should he
ever fall into the hands of the enemy. His crafty skill, however,
protected him, and among the Emirs gathered at Firket there was none whose
death would have given greater satisfaction to the military authorities
than the man who was now to replace Hammuda.
Whether Osman Azrak had actually assumed command on the 6th of June
is uncertain. It seems more likely that Hammuda declined to admit his
right, and that the matter still stood in dispute. But in any case Osman
was determined to justify his appointment by his activity, and about
midday he started from the camp at Firket, and, accompanied by a strong
patrol of camel-men, set out to reconnoitre Akasha. Moving cautiously,
he arrived unperceived within sight of the position at about three o'clock
in the afternoon. The columns which were to storm Firket at dawn were then
actually parading. But the clouds of dust which the high wind drove across
or whirled about the camp obscured the view, and the Dervish could
distinguish nothing unusual. He therefore made the customary pentagonal
mark on the sand to ensure good luck, and so returned to Firket to renew
his dispute with Hammuda, bearing the reassuring news that 'the Turks
lay quiet.'
The force which the Sirdar had concentrated for the capture of Firket
amounted to about nine thousand men, and was organised as follows: -
Commander-in-Chief: THE SIRDAR
The Infantry Division: COLONEL HUNTER Commanding
1st Brigade 2nd Brigade 3rd Brigade
Major LEWIS MAJOR MACDONALD MAJOR MAXWELL
3rd Egyptians IXth Soudanese 2nd Egyptians
4th " XIth " 7th "
Xth Soudanese XIIth " 8th "
XIIIth "
Mounted Forces:
