At The End Of 1891 Father Ohrwalder Made
His Escape From Omdurman And Reached The Egyptian Territory.
Besides giving
the Intelligence Department much valuable information, he published a
thrilling account of his captivity [TEN YEARS' CAPTIVITY, Father
Ohrwalder], which created a wide and profound impression in England.
In 1895 a still more welcome fugitive reached Assuan.
Early on the 16th
of March a weary, travel-stained Arab, in a tattered jibba and mounted on
a lame and emaciated camel, presented himself to the Commandant. He was
received with delighted wonder, and forthwith conducted to the best
bath-room available. Two hours later a little Austrian gentleman stepped
forth, and the telegraph hastened to tell the news that Slatin, sometime
Governor of Darfur, had escaped from the Khalifa's clutches. Here at last
was a man who knew everything that concerned the Dervish Empire - Slatin,
the Khalifa's trusted and confidential servant, almost his friend,
who had lived with him, who was even permitted to dine with him alone,
who had heard all his counsels, who knew all his Emirs, and moreover
Slatin, the soldier and administrator, who could appreciate all he had
learned, was added with the rank of Pasha to the Staff of the Intelligence
Department. While his accurate knowledge confirmed the belief of the
Egyptian authorities that the Dervish power was declining, his tale of
'Fire and Sword in the Soudan' increased the horror and anger of thoughtful
people in England at the cruelties of the Khalifa. Public opinion began to
veer towards the policy of re-conquest.
The year 1895 brought in a Conservative and Unionist Administration.
A Government came into office supported by a majority which was so strong
that there seemed little reason to expect a transference of power for five
or six years. Ministers were likely to be able to carry to a definite
conclusion any projects they might devise. They belonged chiefly to that
party in the State which had consistently assailed Mr. Gladstone's Egyptian
policy. Here was an opportunity of repairing the damage done by their
opponents. The comparisons that would follow such an accomplishment were
self-evident and agreeable even to anticipate. The idea of re-conquering
the Soudan presented itself indefinitely, but not unpleasingly, alike to
the Government and the people of Great Britain. The unforeseen course
of events crystallised the idea into a policy.
On the 1st of March, 1896, the battle of Adowa was fought, and Italy
at the hands of Abyssinia sustained a crushing defeat. Two results
followed which affected other nations. First, a great blow had been struck
at European prestige in North Africa. It seemed probable that the
Abyssinian success would encourage the Dervishes to attack the Italians at
Kassala. It was possible that they might also attack the Egyptians at
Suakin or on the Wady Halfa frontier. Secondly, the value of Italy as a
factor in European politics was depreciated. The fact that her defeat had
been assisted by the arms and munitions of war which had been supplied to
the Abyssinians from French and Russian sources complicated the situation.
The Triple Alliance was concerned. The third partner had been weakened.
The balance might be restored if Great Britain would make some open
sign of sympathy.
Moreover, the expectations of the Egyptian military authorities were
soon fulfilled. The Dervishes threatened Kassala as soon as the news of
Adowa reached them, and indeed there were signs of increased activity in
Omdurman itself. In these circumstances the British Government determined
to assist Italy by making a demonstration on the Wady Halfa frontier.
They turned to Egypt. It had always been recognised that the recovery of
the lost provinces was a natural and legitimate aspiration. 'The doubtful
point was to decide the time when the military and financial resources of
the country were sufficiently developed to justify an assumption of the
offensive.' [LORD CROMER'S REPORTS: EGYPT, No. 2, 1896.] From a purely
Egyptian point of view the best possible moment had not yet arrived.
A few more years of recuperation were needed. The country would fight the
Soudan campaigns more easily if first refreshed by the great reservoirs
which were projected. For more than two years both projects had been
pressed upon the Government of his Highness the Khedive - or, to write
definitely, upon Lord Cromer. At regular intervals Sir Herbert Kitchener
and Sir William Garstin would successively visit the British Agency
(it would be treason to call it 'Government House') - the one to urge
the case for a war, the other to plead for a reservoir. The reservoir
had won. Only a few weeks before the advance to Dongola was ordered
Garstin met Kitchener returning from the Agency. The engineer inquired
the result of the General's interview. 'I'm beaten,' said Kitchener
abruptly; 'you've got your dam' - and Garstin went on his way rejoicing.
The decision of the British Government came therefore as a complete
surprise to the Cairene authorities. The season of the year was
unfavourable to military operations. The hot weather was at hand. The Nile
was low. Lord Cromer's report, which had been published in the early days
of March, had in no way foreshadowed the event. The frontier was tranquil.
With the exception of a small raid on a village in the Wady Halfa district
and an insignificant incursion into the Tokar Delta the Dervish forces had
during the year maintained 'a strictly defensive attitude.' [EGYPT, No. 1,
1896.] Lord Cromer, however, realised that while the case for the
reservoirs would always claim attention, the re-conquest of the Soudan
might not receive the support of a Liberal Government. The increasing
possibility of French intrigues upon the Upper Nile had also to be
considered. All politics are series of compromises and bargains, and while
the historian may easily mark what would have been the best possible
moment for any great undertaking, a good moment must content the
administrator. Those who guarded the interests of Egypt could hardly
consent to an empty demonstration on the Wady Halfa frontier at her
expense, and the original intention of the British Government was at once
extended to the re-conquest of the Dongola province - a definite and
justifiable enterprise which must in any case be the first step towards
the recovery of the Soudan.
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