On the very day of his arrival at Khartoum,
while the townsfolk were cheering his name in the streets
And the
batteries were firing joyful salutes, while the people of England thought
his mission already accomplished and the Government congratulated
themselves on the wisdom of their action, General Gordon sat himself
down and telegraphed a formal request to Cairo for Zubehr Pasha.
The whole story of his relations with Zubehr is extremely characteristic.
Zubehr's son, Suliman, had been executed, if not by Gordon's orders,
at least during his administration of the Soudan and with his complete
approval. 'Thus,' he had said, 'does God make gaps in the ranks of His
enemies.' He had hardly started from London on his new mission, when he
telegraphed to Sir Evelyn Baring, telling him that Zubehr was a most
dangerous man and requesting that he might be at once deported to Cyprus.
This was, of course, quite beyond the powers or intention of the British
Agent. The General arrived in Cairo like a whirlwind close behind his
telegram, and was very angry to hear that Zubehr was still in Egypt.
Before starting up the river he went to see Sherif Pasha. In the
ex-Minister's ante-room he met the very man he had determined to avoid
- Zubehr. He greeted him with effusion. They had a long talk about
the Soudan, after which Gordon hurried to the Agency and informed
Sir Evelyn Baring that Zubehr must accompany him to Khartoum at once.
Baring was amazed. He did not himself disapprove of the plan. He had,
in fact, already recommended it. But he thought the change in Gordon's
attitude too sudden to be relied on. To-morrow he might change again.
He begged the General to think more seriously of the matter. Gordon with
his usual frankness admitted that his change of mind had been very sudden.
He had been conscious, he said, of a 'mystic feeling' that Zubehr was
necessary to save the situation in the Soudan.
Gordon left Cairo still considering the matter. So soon as he made
his formal demand from Khartoum for the assistance of Zubehr it was
evident that his belief in the old slave dealer's usefulness was a sound
conviction and not a mere passing caprice. Besides, he had now become
'the man on the spot,' and as such his words carried double force.
Sir Evelyn Baring determined to support the recommendation with his whole
influence. Never was so good a case made out for the appointment of
so bad a man. The Envoy Extraordinary asked for him; Colonel Stewart,
his colleague, concurred; the British Agent strongly urged the request;
the Egyptian Government were unanimous; and behind all these were ranged
every single person who had the slightest acquaintance with the Soudan.
nothing could exceed the vigour with which the demand was made.
On the 1st of March General Gordon telegraphed: 'I tell you plainly,
it is impossible to get Cairo employees out of Khartoum unless the
Government helps in the way I told you. They refuse Zubehr . . . .
but it was the only chance.' And again on the 8th: 'If you do not
send Zubehr, you have no chance of getting the garrisons away.'
'I believe,' said Sir Evelyn Baring in support of these telegrams,
'that General Gordon is quite right when he says that Zubehr Pasha is
the only possible man. Nubar is strongly in favour of him. Dr. Bohndorf,
the African traveller, fully confirms what General Gordon says of the
influence of Zubehr.' The Pasha was vile, but indispensable.
Her Majesty's Government refused absolutely to have anything to do
with Zubehr. They declined to allow the Egyptian Government to employ him.
They would not entertain the proposal, and scarcely consented to
discuss it. The historians of the future may occupy their leisure and
exercise their wits in deciding whether the Ministers and the people were
right or wrong; whether they had a right to indulge their sensitiveness
at so terrible a cost; whether they were not more nice than wise; whether
their dignity was more offended by what was incurred or by what
was avoided.
General Gordon has explained his views very clearly and concisely:
'Had Zubehr Pasha been sent up when I asked for him, Berber would in all
probability never have fallen, and one might have made a Soudan Government
in opposition to the Mahdi. We choose to refuse his coming up because of
his antecedents in re slave trade; granted that we had reason, yet, as we
take no precautions as to the future of these lands with respect to the
slave trade, the above opposition seems absurd. I will not send up 'A'
because he will do this, but I will leave the country to 'B', who will do
exactly the same [Major-General Gordon, JOURNALS AT KHARTOUM.]
But if the justice of the decision is doubtful, its consequences were
obvious. Either the British Government were concerned with the Soudan,
or they were not. If they were not, then they had no reason or right to
prohibit the appointment of Zubehr. If they were, they were bound to see
that the garrisons were rescued. It was an open question whether Great
Britain was originally responsible for the safety of the garrisons.
General Gordon contended that we were bound to save them at all costs,
and he backed his belief with his life. Others may hold that Governments
have no right to lay, or at any rate must be very judicious in the laying
of burdens on the backs of their own countrymen in order that they may
indulge a refined sense of chivalry towards foreigners. England had not
misgoverned the Soudan, had not raised the revolt or planted the
garrisons. All that Egypt had a right to expect was commiseration.
But the moment Zubehr was prohibited the situation was changed.
The refusal to permit his employment was tantamount to an admission that
affairs in the Soudan involved the honour of England as well as the honour
of Egypt.
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