When difficulties and dangers perplex all minds, it has often
happened in history that many men by different lines of thought arrive
at the same conclusion.
No complete record has yet been published
of the telegrams which passed between the Government and their agent
at this juncture. The Blue-books preserve a disingenuous discretion.
But it is known that from the very first Sir Evelyn Baring was bitterly
opposed to General Gordon's appointment. No personal friendship existed
between them, and the Administrator dreaded the return to the feverish
complications of Egyptian politics of the man who had always been
identified with unrest, improvisation, and disturbance. The pressure was,
however, too strong for him to withstand. Nubar Pasha, the Foreign Office,
the British public, everyone clamoured for the appointment. Had Baring
refused to give way, it is probable that he would have been overruled.
At length he yielded, and, as soon as his consent had been obtained,
the government turned with delight to Gordon. On the 17th of January
Lord Wolseley requested him to come to England. On the 18th he met
the Cabinet. That same night he started on the long journey
from which he was never to return.
Gordon embarked on his mission in high spirits, sustained by
that belief in personality which too often misleads great men and
beautiful women. It was, he said, the greatest honour ever conferred
upon him. Everything smiled. The nation was delighted. The Ministers
were intensely relieved. The most unbounded confidence was reposed
in the envoy. His interview with the Khedive was 'very satisfactory.'
His complete authority was proclaimed to all the notables and natives
of the Soudan [Proclamation of the Khedive, January 26, 1884.] He was
assured of the support of the Egyptian Government [Sir E. Baring to
Major-General Gordon, January 25, 1884.] The London Foreign Office,
having with becoming modesty admitted that they had not 'sufficient
local knowledge,' [Earl Granville to Sir E. Baring, January 22, 1884.]
accorded him 'widest discretionary power.' [Sir E. Baring to Earl
Granville, February 1, 1884.] One hundred thousand pounds was placed
to his credit, and he was informed that further sums would be supplied
when this was exhausted. He was assured that no effort would be wanting
on the part of the Cairene authorities, whether English or Egyptian,
to afford him all the support and co-operation in their power
[Sir E. Baring to Major-General Gordon, January 25, 1884.] 'There is
no sort of difference,' wrote Sir Evelyn Baring, 'between General
Gordon's views and those entertained by Nubar Pasha and myself.'
[Sir E. Baring to Earl Granville, February 1,1884.] Under these
propitious auguries the dismal and disastrous enterprise began.
His task, though difficult and, as it ultimately proved, impossible,
was clearly defined. 'You will bear in mind,' wrote Sir Evelyn Baring,
'that the main end to be pursued is the evacuation of the Soudan.'
'The object. . . of your mission to the Soudan,' declared the Khedive,
'is to carry into execution the evacuation of those territories and to
withdraw our troops, civil officials, and such of the inhabitants . . .
as may wish to leave for Egypt. . . and after the evacuation to take the
necessary steps for establishing an organised Government in the different
provinces.' Nor was he himself under any misconception. He drew up a
memorandum when on board the Tanjore in which he fully acquiesced in
the evacuation of the Soudan. In a sentence which breathes the same
spirit as Mr. Gladstone's famous expression, 'a people rightly struggling
to be free,' he wrote: 'I must say that it would be an iniquity to
conquer these peoples and then hand them back to the Egyptians without
guarantees of future good government.' Finally, he unhesitatingly
asserted: 'No one who has ever lived in the Soudan can escape the
reflection "What a useless possession is this land!"' And Colonel Stewart,
who accompanied him and endorsed the memorandum, added: 'And what a huge
encumbrance to Egypt!' Thus far there was complete agreement
between the British envoy and the Liberal Cabinet.
It is beyond the scope of these pages to describe his long ride
across the desert from Korosko to Abu Hamed, his interview with the
notables at Berber, or his proclamation of the abandonment of the Soudan,
which some affirm to have been an important cause of his ruin.
On the 22nd of February he arrived at Khartoum. He was received with
rejoicing by the whole population. They recognised again their just
Governor-General and their present deliverer. Those who had been about
to fly for the north took fresh heart. They believed that behind the
figure of the envoy stood the resources of an Empire. The Mahdi and the
gathering Dervishes were perplexed and alarmed. Confusion and hesitancy
disturbed their councils and delayed their movements. Gordon had come.
The armies would follow. Both friends and foes were deceived. The great
man was at Khartoum, but there he would remain - alone.
Whatever confidence the General had felt in the power of his personal
influence had been dispelled on the journey to Khartoum. He had no more
illusions. His experienced eye reviewed the whole situation. He saw
himself confronted with a tremendous racial movement. The people of
the Soudan had risen against foreigners. His only troops were Soudanese.
He was himself a foreigner. Foremost among the leaders of the revolt
were the Arab slave dealers, furious at the attempted suppression of
their trade. No one, not even Sir Samuel Baker, had tried harder to
suppress it than Gordon. Lastly, the whole movement had assumed a
fanatical character. Islam marched against the infidel. Gordon was a
Christian. His own soldiers were under the spell they were to try to
destroy. To them their commander was accursed. Every influence was
hostile, and in particular hostile to his person. The combined forces
of race, class, and religion were against him.
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