All The Warlike Operations Of Mohammedan Peoples Are Characterised
By Fanaticism, But With This General Reservation It May Be Said
- That the
Arabs who destroyed Yusef, who assaulted El Obeid, who annihilated Hicks
fought in the glory of religious zeal;
That the Arabs who opposed Graham,
Earle, and Stewart fought in defence of the soil; and that the Arabs who
were conquered by Kitchener fought in the pride of an army. Fanatics
charged at Shekan; patriots at Abu Klea; warriors at Omdurman.
In order to describe conveniently the changing character of the revolt,
I have anticipated the story and must revert to a period when the social
and racial influences were already weakening and the military spirit
was not yet grown strong. If the defeat of Yusef Pasha decided the whole
people of the Soudan to rise in arms and strike for their liberties,
the defeat of Hicks satisfied the British Government that those liberties
were won. The powerful influence of the desire to rule prompted
the Khedive's Ministers to make still further efforts to preserve their
country's possessions. Had Egypt been left to herself, other desperate
efforts would have been made. But the British Government had finally
abandoned the policy of non-interference with Egyptian action in the
Soudan. They 'advised' its abandonment. The protests of Sherif Pasha
provoked Lord Granville to explain the meaning of the word 'advice.'
The Khedive bowed to superior authority. The Minister resigned.
The policy of evacuation was firmly adopted. 'Let us,' said the
Ministers, 'collect the garrisons and come away.' It was simple to decide
on the course to be pursued, but almost impossible to follow it. Several
of the Egyptian garrisons, as in Darfur and El Obeid, had already fallen.
The others were either besieged, like Sennar, Tokar, and Sinkat,
or cut off from the north, as in the case of the Equatorial Province,
by the area of rebellion. The capital of the Soudan was, however, as yet
unmolested; and as its Egyptian population exceeded the aggregate of the
provincial towns, the first task of the Egyptian Government was obvious.
Mr. Gladstone's Administration had repressed the revolt of Arabi Pasha.
Through their policy the British were in armed occupation of Egypt.
British officers were reorganising the army. A British official supervised
the finances. A British plenipotentiary 'advised' the re-established
Tewfik. A British fleet lay attentive before the ruins of Alexandria,
and it was evident that Great Britain could annex the country in name
as well as in fact. But Imperialism was not the object of the Radical
Cabinet. Their aim was philanthropic and disinterested. As they were now
determined that the Egyptians should evacuate the Soudan, so they
had always been resolved that the British should evacuate Egypt.
Throughout this chapter it will be seen that the desire to get out
of the country at once is the keynote of the British policy. Every act,
whether of war or administration, is intended to be final. Every despatch
is directed to breaking the connection between the two countries
and winding up the severed strings. But responsibilities which had been
lightly assumed clung like the shirt of Nessus. The ordinary practice
of civilised nations demanded that some attempt should be made to justify
interference by reorganisation. The British Government watched therefore
with anxious solicitude the efforts of Egypt to evacuate the Soudan
and bring the garrisons safely home. They utterly declined to assist
with military force, but they were generous with their advice. Everybody
at that time distrusted the capacities of the Egyptians, and it was
thought the evacuation might be accomplished if it were entrusted to
stronger and more honest men than were bred by the banks of the Nile.
The Ministers looked about them, wondering how they could assist the
Egyptian Government without risk or expense to themselves, and in an
evil hour for their fame and fortunes someone whispered the word 'Gordon.'
Forthwith they proceeded to telegraph to Cairo: 'Would General Charles
Gordon be of any use to you or to the Egyptian Government; and, if so,
in what capacity'? The Egyptian Government replied through Sir Evelyn
Baring that as the movement in the Soudan was partly religious they were
'very much averse' from the appointment of a Christian in high command.
The eyes of all those who possessed local knowledge were turned to
a different person. There was one man who might stem the tide of Mahdism,
who might perhaps restore the falling dominion of Egypt, who might at
least save the garrisons of the Soudan. In their necessity and distress
the Khedivial advisers and the British plenipotentiary looked
as a desperate remedy to the man whose liberty they had curtailed,
whose property they had confiscated, and whose son they
had executed - Zubehr Pasha.
This was the agent for whom the Government of Egypt hankered.
The idea was supported by all who were acquainted with the local
conditions. A week after Sir Evelyn Baring had declined General Gordon's
services he wrote: 'Whatever may be Zubehr's faults, he is said to be
a man of great energy and resolution. The Egyptian Government considers
that his services may be very useful. . . . Baker Pasha is anxious to
avail himself of Zubehr Pasha's services.'[Sir Evelyn Baring, letter of
December 9, 1883.] It is certain that had the Egyptian Government been
a free agent, Zubehr would have been sent to the Soudan as its Sultan,
and assisted by arms, money, and perhaps by men, to make head against
the Mahdi. It is probable that at this particular period the Mahdi would
have collapsed before a man whose fame was nearly equal to, and whose
resources would have been much greater than, his own. But the British
Ministry would countenance no dealings with such a man. They scouted the
idea of Zubehr, and by so doing increased their obligation to suggest
an alternative. Zubehr being rejected, Gordon remained. It is scarcely
possible to conceive a greater contrast than that which these two men
presented.
Enter page number
PreviousNext
Page 14 of 126
Words from 13183 to 14187
of 127807