Firing ceased at last at three o'clock, and the victors
were left to measure their losses and their achievement.
There was neither time nor opportunity to count the enemy's dead,
but it is certain that at least 500 Arabs were killed on the island.
Two thousand one hundred and twenty-seven fighting men and several hundred
women and children surrendered. Five hundred and seventy-six rifles,
large quantities of ammunition, and a huge pile of spears and swords
were captured. Ahmed Fedil, indeed, escaped with a numerous following
across the Ghezira, but so disheartened were the Dervishes by this crushing
defeat that the whole force surrendered to the gunboat Metemma at Reng,
on the White Nile, on the 22nd of January, and their leader was content
to fly with scarcely a dozen followers to join the Khalifa.
The casualties among the troops in the action amounted to 41 killed
and 145 wounded, including Major Fergusson; and the Xth Soudanese, on whom
the brunt of the fighting fell, suffered a loss of 25 non-commissioned
officers and men killed, 1 British officer, 6 native officers, and 117
non-commissioned officers and men wounded, out of a total strength of 511.
The rest of the loss was among the irregulars, 495 of whom took part
in the engagement.
CHAPTER XIX: THE END OF THE KHALIFA
By the operations described in the last chapter, the whole of the regions
bordering on the Niles were cleared of hostile forces, dotted with military
posts, and brought back to Egyptian authority. The Khalifa, however, still
remained in Kordofan. After he had made good his escape from the
battlefield of Omdurman, Abdullah had hurried in the direction of El Obeid,
moving by the wells of Shat and Zeregia, which at that season of the year
were full of water after the rains. At Abu Sherai, having shaken off the
pursuit of the friendlies, he halted, encamped, and busily set to work to
reorganise his shattered forces. How far he succeeded in this
will presently be apparent. In the beginning of November the general
drying-up of the country turned the wells at Abu Sherai into pools of mud,
and the Khalifa moved westward to Aigaila. Here he was joined by the Emir
El Khatem with the El Obeid garrison. This chief and his followers
had never been engaged with the 'Turks,' and were consequently fresh
and valiant. Their arrival greatly encouraged the force which the Khalifa
had rallied. A large dem was formed at Aigaila, and here, since the water
was plentiful during December, Abdullah abode quietly, sending his raiding
parties far afield to collect grain and other supplies.
As soon as the Sirdar, who had returned from England, received the news
of the success at Rosaires he determined to make an attempt to capture
the Khalifa; and on the 29th of December sent for Colonel Kitchener,
to whom as the senior available officer he had decided to entrust this
honourable enterprise. The colonel was directed to take a small mixed force
into Kordofan and to reconnoitre the enemy's position. If possible, he was
to attack and capture Abdullah, whose followers were believed not to exceed
1,000 ill-armed men. The 'Kordofan Field Force,' as its officers called it,
was formed as follows:
Commanding: COLONEL KITCHENER
Assistant Adjutant-General: LIEUT.-COLONEL MITFORD
Deputy-Assistant Adjutant-General: MAJOR WILLIAMS
Troops:
Two squadrons Egyptian Cavalry
2nd Egyptians
XIVth Soudanese
Two galloping Maxims
Two mule guns
One company Camel Corps.
Camel transport was drawn from the Atbara and from the Blue Nile.
The troops were conveyed by steamer to Duem, and concentrated there during
the first week in 1899. The camels were collected at Kawa, and, although
several of the convoys had to march as much as 400 miles, the whole number
had arrived by the 10th of January.
The prime difficulty of the operation was the want of water.
The Khalifa's position was nearly 125 miles from the river. The intervening
country is, in the wet season, dotted with shallow lakes, but by January
these are reduced to mud puddles and only occasional pools remain. All the
water needed by the men, horses, and mules of the column must therefore be
carried. The camels must go thirsty until one of the rare pools - the likely
places for which were known to the native guides - might be found.
Now, the capacity of a camel for endurance without drinking is famous;
but it has its limits. If he start having filled himself with water,
he can march for five days without refreshment. If he then have another
long drink, he can continue for five days more. But this strains his power
to the extreme; he suffers acutely during the journey, and probably dies
at its end. In war, however, the miseries of animals cannot be considered;
their capacity for work alone concerns the commander. It was thought that,
partly by the water carried in skins, partly by the drying-up pools,
and partly by the camel's power of endurance, it might be just possible
for a force of about 1,200 men to strike out 125 miles into the desert,
to have three days to do their business in, and to come back to the Nile.
This operation, which has been called the Shirkela Reconnaissance,
occupied the Kordofan Field Force.
The report of the route from Kohi was considered encouraging.
At Gedid the old wells promised sufficient water to refill the skins,
and within seven miles of the wells were two large pools at which the
camels could be watered. The column, therefore, prepared for the journey.
Nothing was neglected which could increase the water carried or diminish
the number of drinkers. Only twelve cavalry were taken.
