I should have arrested and transported
him to Khartoum when he first arrived at Gondokoro with the cattle
stolen from the Shir; which caused the subsequent massacre of the five
soldiers of the government.
At the same time that I admit this error, it must be remembered that I
was placed in an awkward position.
"Absolute and supreme power" is a high-sounding title; but how was I to
exert it?
I was an individual possessing a nominal power, the application of which
required extreme delicacy. I was determined to win, and with God's help
I did win, but every step necessitated the coolest judgment. Had I
adopted severe or extreme measures against Abou Saood, I might have
ruined the expedition at commencement.
It was impossible to know who was faithful. There was a general leaning
towards his favour among all the officers, with whom he had been in
close connection when in Khartoum. He was a man in a high social
position in the Soudan, the partner of the great firm of Agad & Co., who
commanded about 2,500 armed men. He had worked for many years in company
with the government, according to his connection by agreement with the
governor-general.
I knew that I had him in my power, provided I should be supported by the
authorities in Egypt; therefore I gave him line, and occasionally held
him tight, as though he had been a salmon on a single gut; but I was
determined to land him safe at last, in such a manner that his greatest
supporter should be obliged to acknowledge that he had received the
fairest play.
