They confessed
afterwards, that it was useless to attempt to fight with such people, as
the earth was full of soldiers who sprang up out of the ground beneath
their feet.
We had been thirty-five days at Belinian, and the enemy had been
entirely subdued. I explained to them my determination of paying them
another visit should we ever be disturbed again at Gondokoro; thus if
they wished for peace, they must remain quiet.
The soldiers and sailors, including all the women of the camp, were
employed for some days in conveying the corn to head-quarters. If our
people had worked well, we should have had a supply for twelve months.
Instead of which, a force of 650 men had actually delivered in the
magazine only 150 urdeps, or about 670 bushels.
I have naturally omitted many military incidents, and have only given an
outline of the Belinian campaign, but the moral effect was good on all
sides. The soldiers had learnt their own superiority to the natives, and
had gained experience and confidence; and the Baris of Belinian had
learnt the truth: and in future we should sleep in peace at
head-quarters.
CHAPTER XI.
SPIRIT OF DISAFFECTION.
The amount of corn collected by the troops, now in the magazines, was
only sufficient for two months' consumption at full rations.
There was a spirit of general disaffection among the officers and
troops.
Although I had worked with them in every difficulty and led them
invariably to success, there was a general dislike, not to me
personally, but to the system of rigid discipline that I was determined
at all hazards to enforce, and to the general object of the expedition.
Neither officers nor men could understand why, during open war, I should
forbid the capture of women and children, who, by all Mohammedan rules,
were lawful prizes!
It was not slave-hunting: they were simple prisoners of war that God had
delivered into their hands; and it was a hard case that, after all the
trouble and difficulties which had been encountered, they should be
debarred from taking a few prisoners.
This was the argument of the military force, to which, had I yielded,
the expedition would have quickly relapsed into the original
slave-hunting of the White Nile, which I was bound to suppress. I have
already described the direct disobedience of the officers in having
purchased 126 slaves secretly from the slave-hunters' station during the
voyage. A slave trade would quickly spring up between the Khedive's
officers and the slave-hunters of Abou Saood, unless I enforced the
strictest discipline. The expedition would represent a government slave
market for the reception of slaves captured by the Khartoum companies.